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IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES
The only appellant in this case is Larry J. Coet Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc. ("Coet").
The only appellee is Labrum Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick, Inc. ("Labrum").
Coet's Brief suggests that Danny R. Labrum individually is a party to this appeal. See
Coet's Brief p. i and caption. That is incorrect. The Trial Court dismissed Danny R. Labrum
from this case. [R. 657; R. 674 at p. 82.] Coet has not appealed that dismissal.
Another party identified in Coet's complaint was Ronald L. Covey. [See R. 9.]
However, there is no record that Covey was ever served, and he never actively participated
in the case.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(j),
78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the Trial Court correctly enter summary judgment in Labrum's favor,

ruling that Coet waived and released its claims for attorney fees and pre-judgment interest
pursuant to a partial settlement agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties?
Standard of Review: A trial court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed for
correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions. Novell, Inc. v. Canopy Group,
Inc., 2004 UT App 162, f 7, 92 P.3d 768. The appellate court considers whether the trial
court correctly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact exists and whether it correctly
applied the law. Id. The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous and the meaning
of a contract are questions of law. Morris v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 1199,
1200-01 (Utah 1983).
Labrum' s position on this issue was preserved in the Trial Court. [See, e.g., R. 99-127,
204-300, 441-79, 551-618, 624-630.]
2.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in determining that Labrum was the

prevailing party on all issues litigated after Labrum's performance of its obligations under
the parties' settlement agreement, and therefore entitled to recover its attorney fees incurred
after that date?

1

Standard of Review: Whether a party is the prevailing party in an action is a decision
left to the sound discretion of the Trial Court and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See
Carlson Distr. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., 2004 UT App 227, f 16, 95 P.3d 1171.
Labrum's position on this issue was preserved in the Trial Court. [See, e.g., R. 551618,624-630.]
3.

Did the evidence at trial support the Trial Court's findings that Coet made a

material misrepresentation in connection with the sale of car parts inventory under the
parties' Asset Sale Agreement, and that Labrum reasonably relied on the misrepresentation?
Standard of Review: The issue of whether Coet made a material misrepresentation is
a question of fact. The issue of whether Labrum reasonably relied on the misrepresentation
is a question of fact. See Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 148-49 (Utah 1998) (whether
plaintiff reasonably relied on misrepresentations is question of fact). A trial court's findings
of fact are reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. See, e.g., Young v. Young, 1999
UT 38, f 15, 979 P.2d 338; Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998);
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Factual findings are clearly erroneous if they are "not adequately
supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the
trial court's determination." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). Coet bears
the burden of marshaling all of the evidence supporting the trial court's finding, and then
showing that the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding. See, e.g.,
Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, f 1, 987 P.2d 588; Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433
(Utah 1998).
2

Labrum's position on this issue was preserved in the Trial Court. [See, e.g., R. 674 at
pp. 113, 117-18, 128-31, 173-74, 182-86.]
4.

Did the evidence at trial support the Trial Court's finding that a 1992 Ford

truck was in Coet's inventory on November 14, 2001 (the date of the closing of the parties'
Asset Sale Agreement)?
Standard of Review: Whether the 1992 Ford truck was in Coet's inventory on
November 14,2001 is a question of fact. A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under
a "clearly erroneous" standard. See, e.g., Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, f 15, 979 P.2d 338;
Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Factual findings are clearly erroneous if they are "not adequately supported by the record,
resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,935-36 (Utah 1994). Coet bears the burden of
marshaling all of the evidence supporting the trial court's finding, and then showing that the
marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding. See, e.g., Tingey v.
Christensen, 1999 UT 68, f 7,987 P.2d 588; Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d425,433 (Utah 1998).
Labrum's position on this issue was preserved in the trial court. [See, e.g., R. 674 at
pp. 64-70, 84-86, 89, 131, 174-79.]
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are no constitutional provisions, statues, ordinances, rules or regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of this appeal or are of central importance to this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In August 2002, Coet and Labrum entered into an Asset Sale Agreement, whereby
Coet agreed to sell, and Labrum agreed to buy, certain assets associated with a Chevrolet car
dealership located in Heber, Utah. See R. 354-433. The sale closed on November 14, 2001.
[R. 674 at p. 117.]
After the closing, a number of disputes arose between the parties. Each party claimed
the other party owed money for a host of various reasons. [See R. 3-10, 17-31, 108-114.]
Coet filed suit against Labrum on November 13,2003. Coet alleged claims for breach
of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. In
essence, Coet alleged Labrum had failed to pay various sums owed under the Asset Sale
Agreement and that Labrum had improperly used Coet's line of credit to make certain
inventory purchases. Coet also asserted a claim for conversion based on an allegation that
Labrum sold a used, 1992 Ford truck that Coet claimed was not part of the used car inventory
conveyed to Labrum under the Asset Sale Agreement. [R. 3-10.]
Labrum denied all substantive allegations of Coet's complaint and filed counterclaims.
Labrum alleged claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, and unjust enrichment. In essence, Labrum alleged Coet had failed to pay, credit or
reimburse various sums owed to Labrum under the Asset Sale Agreement. Labrum also
asserted a claim for fraud and misrepresentation. Labrum alleged that just prior to the
closing of the Asset Sale Agreement, Larry Coet falsely represented to Labrum that Coet did
not have an "Obsolete Parts" problem, referring to the nature and condition of the parts in
4

inventory in Coet's service department. This representation was important, because the
purchase price under the Asset Sale Agreement depended in part on the value of the car parts
inventory, excluding Obsolete Parts. Labrum's counterclaim alleged that it relied on Mr.
Coet's false representation by agreeing that no adjustment would be made to the purchase
price based on the parts inventory. [R. 17-31.]
After the initial pleadings were filed, the case languished for many months. Coet and
Labrum informally attempted to resolve their disputes, but had difficulty defining the precise
nature of the claims and amounts at issue. Finally, after lengthy negotiations, the parties
mutually agreed to make a comprehensive list of all claims they had against each other, and
to have those claims submitted to a team of two accountants (the "Evaluation Team"). This
agreement was memorialized in a letter agreement dated February 9, 2005, referred to the
Resolution Agreement. [R. 73-79.] A copy of the Resolution Agreement is attached as
Addendum 2.
The parties agreed that the purpose of the Resolution Agreement was to "resolv[e] all
of the respective claims between the parties, with the exception of whether either party is
legally responsible to the other party for parts obsolescence." [R. 76.] The parties agreed that
they would each pay any sums unanimously found to be owed by the Evalaution Team, and
expressly provided that upon such payment, any and all claims between them would be
expressly released, save only those issues on which the Evaluation Team could not reach a
unanimous decision and claims relating to Obsolete Parts. [See R. 74-75.] The Obsolete
Parts issue was excepted because the parties agreed it would not be appropriate for the
5

Evaluation Team, comprised of two accountants, to determine whether Coet was legally
liable for fraud or misrepresentation. [See, e.g., R. 78-79, 240.]
The Evaluation Team completed their work and issued a report in April 2005. The
Evaluation Team determined that each party owed the other on certain claims, with a net
result that Labrum owed Coet $59,384.79. [R. 104-106.] (A copy of the Evaluation Team's
report is attached as Addendum 3.) Labrum promptly paid that sum as it had agreed to do
in the Resolution Agreement. [R. 102.]
The Evaluation Team left four issues unresolved: (1) the value of parts in inventory
at the date of closing and the extent of any Obsolete Parts; (2) whether either party owed the
other any sum for the new vehicle inventory; (3) the dollar value of gas and oil inventory at
the date of closing; and (4) whether any sum was owed based on the 1992 Ford truck. [R.
104-06.]
After the Evaluation Team issued its report and after Labrum paid the net amount
owed to Coet, Coet attempted to go back to the well by demanding additional payments for
attorney fees and interest. [E.g., R. 121, 178-190.] Coet had failed to assert those claims in
the Resolution Agreement. [R. 73-79.] Labrum argued that claims not expressly preserved
in the Resolution Agreement were waived pursuant to the release provisions in Paragraphs
3, 9 and 10 of the Resolution Agreement. [Kg., R. 117-121.]
Labrum then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of attorney fees
and prejudgment interest. [R. 100-101.] The Trial Court granted Labrum's motion and
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dismissed Coet's claims for attorney fees and interest. [R. 317-326.] The Trial Court
reconsidered and confirmed its ruling in connection with a motion in limine. [R. 510-511.]
The parties then proceeded to trial on the remaining claims and counterclaim. The
Trial Court conducted a bench trial on August 8, 2006. Three basic issues were tried: (1)
whether Labrum owed Coet anything for the 1992 Ford truck; (2) whether Labrum owed
Coet anything for the oil and gas in inventory as of November 14, 2001; and (3) whether
Coet was liable to Labrum for misrepresentation or fraud. [R. 674.] Labrum prevailed on
all issues at trial. The Trial Court dismissed Coet's claims and entered judgment on
Labrum's counterclaim for fraud and misrepresentation in the amount of $ 11,455.26. [R. 674
at pp. 190-199,522,655-658.]
After the trial, Coet filed a motion to recover of all of its attorney fees, claiming that
it was the prevailing party. [R. 526-550.] Labrum filed a cross-motion for recovery of its
attorney fees, but limited its request to those attorney fees and costs incurred after it had paid
the sums owed under the Evalution Team's report. Labrum asserted that all attorney fees and
costs incurred prior to the date of that payment had been waived and released pursuant to the
parties' Resolution Agreement. Labrum further asserted that it was the prevailing party on
all claims that survived the Resolution Agreement. [R. 551-618.]
On November 1, 2006, the Trial Court entered its Ruling in favor of Labrum on the
attorney fees issue. The Trial Court determined that Labrum was the prevailing party on all
litigated claims and awarded fees to Labrum. [R. 634-641.] The Trial Court then entered a
final Judgment and Order in favor of Labrum in the amount of $40,005.26. Of that sum,
7

$ 11,455.26 represented a judgment on the fraud/misrepresentation counterclaim, and $29,715
represented an award of fees and costs. [R. 655-658.] This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED
I.

COET AGREES TO SELL, AND LABRUM AGREES TO BUY, ASSETS OF
A CHEVROLET DEALERSHIP PURSUANT TO AN ASSET SALE
AGREEMENT.
1.

Coet owned and operated a Chevrolet dealership in Heber City, Utah. [R. 674

at pp. 14-15.]
2.

In August 2001, Coet entered into an Asset Sale Agreement, by which he

agreed to sell, and Labrum agreed to buy, certain assets related to the Chevrolet dealership.
[R. 411-433; R., 674 at p. 16.] The Asset Sale Agreement is attached as Addendum 1.
3.

The "Purchase Price" for the Assets was $350,000, "as may be adjusted at the

Closing pursuant to the terms of this Agreement." [R. 429.]
4.

The sale ultimately closed on November 14, 2001. [R. 674 at p. 117.]

5.

The "Assets" to be conveyed under the Asset Sale Agreement included "[a]ll

used motor vehicles which are in the Seller's inventory at the time of Closing ..." [R. 432.]
6.

Coet was required to deliver "good, marketable and legal title to and right of

possession of the Assets [including the used vehicle inventory] free and clear of all liens and
encumbrances whatsoever." [R. 427 (Asset Sale Agreement § 5.1(b); accord Asset Sale
Agreement §§ 5.1(e), 5.1(g), 5.1(k), 6.1(a)).]
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II.

A 1992 FORD TRUCK IS PART OF THE ASSETS SOLD.
7.

Six days before the closing, on November 8,2001, Gary Robinson purchased

a new pickup truck from Coet. [R. 674, p. 64.]
8.

At that time, Robinson owned a used 1991 Chevrolet truck, which he proposed

trading in to Coet as part of the new truck purchase. [R. 674, pp. 64-65, 70.]
9.

However, Robinson's friend, Johnny Jessen, was with Robinson at the Coet

dealership. Jessen wanted Robinson's used Chevrolet truck. Jessen owned a 1992 Ford
truck, and offered to allow Coet to take his 1992 Ford truck as a trade in substitute for
Robinson's Chevrolet truck. The parties agreed that Robinson would take the new Chevrolet
truck, Jessen would take Robinson's used Chevrolet truck, and Coet would take Jessen's
used 1992 Ford truck as a trade in. [R. 674, pp. 65-66, 84, 89.]
10.

Jessen did not have his 1992 Ford truck with him at the Coet dealership on

November 8. [R. 674, p. 66.] Robinson left his used Chevrolet truck at the Coet dealership
on November 8, and drove away in the new Chevrolet truck. [R. 674, pp. 66-67.] Jessen
agreed to deliver the 1992 Ford truck to Coet as soon as possible. [R. 674, p. 68.]
11.

Jessen delivered his 1992 Ford truck to Coet at approximately 6:00 a.m. on

November 13, 2001. He parked the Ford truck under a carport at the Coet dealership, and
put the title (with his signature) and two sets of keys to the truck in Coet's night drop box.
He drove away in the 1991 Chevrolet truck. [R. 674, pp. 85, 88.]
12.

At the time Jessen delivered the 1992 Ford truck to Coet on November 13,

Jessen had paid off a prior loan on the Ford truck, and the title to that truck was clear. [R.
9

342 (Jessen's title to Ford truck showing release of lien by Zion's bank in 1999); R. 674, p.
86.]
13.

As of November 8, 2001, Robinson owed approximately $2,300 to a credit

union on his used Chevrolet truck. [R. 674, pp. 65, 67.]
14.

Coet eventually paid off the balance of $2,300 owed on Robinson's used

Chevrolet truck. [See R. 674 at p. 65, 67 (Robinson's testimony that he owed $2,300 on the
Chevrolet truck to a credit union); R. 343 (showing payment by Coet to CUP Federal Credit
Union in the amount of $2,300 with notation "Gary Robinson Pay off').]
15.

Labium sold the 1992 Ford truck three months later in January 2002, after

making repairs or spending money to have it repaired. Coet never made any hint of any
claim to ownership of the 1992 Ford truck until long after it was sold. [R. 674 at pp. 91-92;
R. 674 at p. 122.]

III. COET FALSELY STATES THAT HE DOES NOT HAVE AN OBSOLETE
PARTS PROBLEM,
16.

The Asset Purchase Agreement provided that the $350,000 Purchase Price

would be reduced if an inventory of all vehicle "Parts" did not show a value of at least
$68,000 in Parts inventory. Section 1.2(b) of the Asset Sale Agreement provided, in relevant
part:
(b) Parts. Based upon a physical inventory of Parts taken immediately
prior to the Closing, if the value of the then existing Parts is less than
$68,000.00, the Purchase Price will be reduced to reflect the difference
between $68,000.00 and the valuation of the inventoried parts and accessories.
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[R.431.]
17.

"Parts" was specifically defined in the Agreement to exclude "Obsolete Parts."

"Obsolete Parts" was defined to consist of: (1) parts not included on the manufacturer's
current pricing list; (2) any part on which the seal had been broken or was materially
damaged; (3) parts that would not be accepted for return by its manufacturer; or (4) parts in
excess of a 180-day supply. [R. 432.]
18.

One or two days before the closing, on November 12 or 13, 2001, prior to the

closing of the sale, Danny Labrum, Rachael Labrum, Lyle Labrum and Larry Coet met at the
dealership to conduct an inventory of car parts in the service department. [R. 674, pp. 113,
125, 128.]
19.

After a few hours of counting parts piece by piece, Danny Labrum determined

there was roughly $68,000 worth of parts, not taking into consideration any Obsolete Parts.
There was no meaningful method for Danny Labrum to identify which parts might be
Obsolete Parts. [R. 674, pp. 127-29.]
20.

Danny Labrum testified that upon concluding that there was roughly $68,000

in parts, he asked Larry Coet if any of these were Obsolete Parts. Coet responded, "I don't
have an obsolescence problem." [R. 674, p. 128.] Rachael Labrum corroborated Danny
Labrum's testimony. [R. 674, p. 113.]
21.

Coet's statement was not true. For example, after closing the sale, Labrum

learned that GM refused to accept a return of $18,000 worth of parts. [R. 674, p. 131.]
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22.

Coet knew or should have known his statement was untrue. For example, Coet

maintained an inventory record dated November 1,2001 that stated the Coet had $25,299.07
worth of parts that had not been moved for over 12 months. [R. 690, Ex. D-12];1 R. 674, p.
131.] The Asset Purchase Agreement defined "Obsolete Parts" to include "Parts in excess
of a one hundred eighty (180) day supply." [R. 432.] Coet did not disclose this inventory
record to Labrum, and Labrum had no access to it, prior to the Closing. [R. 674, pp. 117-18,
131.]
23.

Coet's statement was important to Labrum. Labrum proceeded forward with

the closing in reliance on Coet's statement that he did not have an obsolescence problem.
Labrum signed closing statements that provided for no adjustment to the purchase price
based on Obsolete Parts. [R. 674, pp. 129-30.]
IV.

LABRUM CLOSES THE ASSET SALE AGREEMENT IN REASONABLE
RELIANCE ON COET'S MISREPRESENTATIONS,
24.

Coet and Labrum closed the Asset Sale Agreement on November 14, 2001.

At the closing, Coet's attorney, Gary Howe, was present. Labrum had no counsel present.
[R. 674 at p. 117.]
25.

At the closing, Labrum signed an "Asset Sale Agreement - Closing Statement."

[R. 352-353.] The Closing Statement stated that "the parties agree that as of the Closing the
conditions set forth in § 1.2(b) did not require any adjustment to the Purchase Price." [R.
353.] The parties also signed a separate document that stated, in part, "Danny Labrum and

1

A copy of the trial exhibit D-12 is attached as Addendum 4.
12

Larry J. Coet agree that parts inventory total $68,000.00." [R. 351.] Labrum testified that he
signed these two documents at the closing in reliance on Larry Coet's representation that he
did not have an Obsolete Parts problem. [R. 674 at p. 130.]
26.

The Closing Statement also provided for a $495 reduction to the Purchase Price

based on the value of used vehicles in inventory as of the Closing Date. [R. 353.]
27.

The 1992 Ford truck was present on the lot at the dealership at the time of the

closing on November 14, 2001. [R. 674 at p. 92; R. 674 at pp. 118-22.]
V.

THE PARTIES AGREE TO A DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM. AND
AGREE TO WAIVE AND RELEASE ALL CLAIMS NOT EXPRESSLY
PRESERVED.
28.

After the closing, the parties each raised many disputed claims about sums that

were owed by each other. [See, e.g., R. 3-10, 17-31, 108-114.]
29.

Following at least a year of negotiations, Coet and Labrum finally agreed to

submit their claims to an "Evaluation Team," a team comprised to two accountants. [See R.
73-79.] The terms of the parties' agreement were memorialized in a letter agreement dated
February 9, 2005, referred to as the Resolution Agreement. [R. 73-79.] A copy of the
Resolution Agreement is attached as Addendum 2.
30.

The Resolution Agreement "set out the terms of our understanding and

agreement with respect to an attempt to resolve disputes between [Coet] and [Labrum]." [R.
79.]
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31.

Pursuant to the Accountants' Evaluation Agreement, Coet Chevrolet designated

Becky Taylor, and Labrum Chevrolet designated Steven Racker, as "Evaluation Team
members" to "conduct an evaluation of the various claims of the respective parties." [R. 79.]
32.

In the Resolution Agreement, the parties agreed to submit all of their respective

claims and counterclaims to the Evaluation Team. The Evaluation Team was directed to
review and analyze the parties' respective claims and endeavor to arrive at a consensus as to
the total value of each claim, whether or not the amounts claimed had been paid, and whether
either party owed the other any amount with respect to such claim. Coet and Labrum agreed
to be bound by the unanimous decision of the Evaluation Team with respect to each claim.
Upon payment of any sums owed, full releases of "any and all" claims were to be effective.
The only exceptions were those specific claims on which the Evaluation Team could not
reach a unanimous conclusion and Labrum's claims relating to Obsolete Parts. [See generally
R. 73-79, esp. R. 74-75.]
33.

With respect to Obsolete Parts, the parties agreed that the Evaluation Team

would attempt to determine the dollar value of "Obsolete Parts" in inventory at the time of
closing, as well as the parts that were not "Obsolete Parts." However, the issue of whether
either party was legally liable to the other based on Obsolete Parts was specifically excluded
because the parties agreed it would not be appropriate for two accountants to decide whether
Coet was legally liable for fraud or misrepresentation. [See R. 78.]
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34.

In the negotiations leading up to the Resolution Agreement, Labrum made it

clear to Coet that all claims of any nature had to be included in the Resolution Agreement,
i.e., "everything needs to be put on the table and addressed or waived." [R. 263.]
35.

Section 3 of the Resolution Agreement stated the "Objective of [the]

Evaluation" as follows:
The Evaluation is intended by Coet and Labrum to be, and shall be conducted
by the Evaluation Team as, an independent examination, assessment, and
application of the relevant provisions of the Asset Sale Agreement and related
documents,/or the purpose of resolving all of the respective claims between
the partiesj with the exception of whether either party is legally responsible
to the other party for parts obsolescence.
[R. 76 (emphasis added).]
36.

Consistent with the stated purpose and Labium's insistence that "everything

needs to be put on the table and addressed or waived," the parties included in the Resolution
Agreement a detailed list of all of their respective claims, ranging from a claim for $31.31
for interest in a GMAC account to a claim for $46,715 for new car inventory. [R. 76-79.]
Although it was given a full opportunity to list all of its claims in the Accountant's
Evaluation Agreement [see R. 222-223, 239-240, 263], Coet did not include any claim for
attorney fees or prejudgment interest in the parties' Resolution Agreement. [See R. 76-79.]
37.

The Evaluation Team produced their written conclusions on about April 27,

2005. They unanimously concluded that each party owed the other various sums on various
claims, with the net result that Labrum owed Coet $59,384.79. R. 104-106; see Addendum
3.
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38.

Consistent with the parties' Agreement, on May 13, 200 Labrum paid

$59,384.79 to Coet as it had agreed to do in the Resolution Agreement. [R. 102.]
39.

Upon payment of the $59,384.79, the release language of the Resolution

Agreement became effective. The release is contained in Section 9 of the Resolution
Agreement and states, in relevant part:
9. Binding Effect; Admissibility of Evaluation Results; Release of
Claims
Upon payment by Labrum of any such sum (if any), Coet, for and
on behalf of himself, itself and its owners, principals, affiliates, officers,
directors, agents, employees, affiliates, successors and assigns, releases and
forever discharges Labrum and its owners, principals, affiliates, officers,
directors, agents, employees, affiliates, successors and assigns, from any and
all claims, demands, suits, causes of action or obligations of whatever
nature, known or unknown, contingent or non-contingent, that anyone
claiming through or under Coet may have or believe to have against
Labrum, including without limitation all claims that relate in any way to the
lawsuit with Civil Number 030500537, currently pending in the Fourth
Judicial District Court of Wasatch County, State of Utah (the "Lawsuit"), and
any claims asserted or that could have been asserted in that lawsuit,
excepting from this release only such claims as to which there is not a
unanimous decision by the Evaluation Team. Upon payment by Coet of any
such sum (if any), Labrum, for and on behalf of himself, itself and its owners,
principals, affiliates, officers, directors, agents, employees, affiliates,
successors and assigns, releases and forever discharges Coet and its owners,
principals, affiliates, officers, directors, agents, employees, affiliates,
successors and assigns, from any and all claims, demands, suits, causes of
action or obligations of whatever nature, known or unknown, contingent or
non-contingent, that anyone claiming through or under Labrum may have or
believe to have against Coet, including without limitation all claims that relate
in any way to the lawsuit with Civil Number 030500537, currently pending in
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Wasatch County, State of Utah, and any
claims asserted or that could have been asserted in that lawsuit, excepting from
this release only such claims as to which there is not a unanimous decision by
the Evaluation Team and claims relating to parts obsolescence. With respect
to parts obsolescence, any unanimous finding or conclusion by the Evaluation
Team with respect to the value of parts that are or are not Obsolete Parts shall
be binding on both Coet and Labrum.
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[R. 74-75 (emphasis added).]
40.

Section 10 of the Accountants' Evaluation Agreement precludes the assertion

of any claims not specifically raised in the Accountants' Evaluation Agreement, as follows:
10. Preclusive Effect on Additional Claims. The parties acknowledge
and agree that the claims raised in this letter agreement constitute all of the
accounting-type claims for damages related to the Asset Sale Agreement and
closing. The parties shall be precluded from raising or asserting (in the
Lawsuit or otherwise) any claims for damages related to the Asset Sale
Agreement and the Closing, except for: (i) any accounting issues that are not
resolved by the Evaluation Team and (ii) any legal issues that must be resolved
in order to achieve a complete resolution of the accounting issues specifically
addressed in this Agreement.
[R. 74.]
41.

The Evaluation Team could not reach a unanimous conclusion on four issues

or claims: (1) the dollar value of parts that were "Obsolete Parts" or not "Obsolete Parts" on
the date of closing; (2) whether a $9,000 payment was for a new vehicle or a used vehicle;
(3) Coet's claim for $4,300 based on the 1992 Ford truck; and (4) Coet's claim for $6,076
based on alleged gas and oil in inventory at the date of closing. [R. 104-106.]
42.

Claims on which the Evaluation Team could not reach a unanimous conclusion,

and the legal issue of whether either party owed the other based on the Obsolete Parts claim
were specifically excepted from the release provisions of the Resolution Agreement. See
Resolution Agreement §§ 2(b), 3, 9; R. 74-76,78. Claims for interest or attorney fees were
not excepted from the release provisions of the Resolution Agreement. See id.
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VI. LABRUM PREVAILS ON ALL CLAIMS AT TRIAL,
43.

Of the four issues left undecided by the Evaluation Team, one issue (the $9,000

payment for the new or used vehicle inventory) was voluntarily dismissed [see R. 332 ("the
parties have narrowed the issues to three disputed facts")], and the remaining three issues
were tried to the Fourth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Derek P. Pullan presiding, on
August 8,2006. Labrum prevailed on all issues presented to the Trial Court at trial. [R. 674,
esp. R. 674 at pp. 190-199; R. 655-658.]
44.

After the trial, the Trial Court awarded to Labrum the attorney fees and costs

it incurred after the effective date of the release of all claims under the Resolution
Agreement. [R. 634-641.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
One of the most difficult obstacles to resolving this case without litigation was that
Coet's alleged claims were a moving target. It seemed Coet's claims and demands changed
every time Labrum attempted to resolve them. Therefore, when the Resolution Agreement
was being negotiated, Labrum insisted that Coet specifically identify and place all of its
claims on the table. Labrum did not want to agree to have the Accounting Team reach a
result, only to find that Coet was claiming something new or different. Labrum therefore
made sure that the Resolution Agreement, to which both parties agreed, specifically required
both parties to list all of their claims, and to have all of those claims submitted to the
Evaluation Team, save only the non-accounting issue of whether Coet was legally liable for
fraud or misrepresentation. Labrum also made sure that the Resolution Agreement contained
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broad release language to assure that Coet could not later assert any additional claim for
payment of any additional sum. These protections were carefully negotiated, specifically
drafted into the language of the Resolution Agreement, and agreed to by both parties.
Labrum fully performed his obligations under the parties' Resolution Agreement, and the
broad release language of that Agreement became effective. Under that Agreement, Coet
waived and released his claims for attorney fees and prejudgment interest,
After the effective date of the release, however, Coet forced Labrum to continue to
incur costs and attorney fees by continuing to pursue unresolved claims. As a result, Labrum
was forced to incur an additional $29,715 in attorney fees between May 13, 2005 (the date
of Labrum's payment) and September 14, 2006 (the date of Labrum's motion for fees). It
is undisputed that Labrum was the prevailing party on all claims litigated after the effective
date of the parties' mutual release. The Trial Court was well within its discretion in
awarding those fees to Labrum. Moreover, this Court should enter an order requiring Coet
to pay all additional attorney fees and costs incurred by Labrum from September 15, 2006
until the conclusion of this case.
The Trial Court's judgment in favor of Labrum on its fraud/misrepresentation claim
cannot be overturned unless the Trial Court's findings are clearly erroneous and unsupported
by the record. Coet has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the Trial Court's findings.
Those findings are more than adequately supported by the trial record.
Similarly, the Trial Court's finding that the 1992 Ford truck was "in inventory" on
November 14,2001 (the closing date) is adequately supported by the record and is not clearly
19

erroneous. In fact, it is undisputed that the 1992 Ford truck was in inventory on that date.
As a matter of law, it was therefore conveyed to Labrum under Section 1.1(b) of the Asset
Sale Agreement.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT COET WAIVED AND
RELEASED ITS CLAIMS FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND INTEREST
PURSUANT TO THE RESOLUTION AGREEMENT,
A.

Coet Does Not Assert any Disagreement with the Trial Court's Findings
of Fact, which Must Be Accepted as True,

In deciding whether a summary judgment was appropriate, an appellate court need
only review whether the Trial Court erred in applying the relevant law and whether a material
fact was in dispute. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, f 16, 73 P.3d 325. In this
case, when the Trial Court granted Labrum's motion for partial summary judgment, it set
forth in detail the undisputed facts on which its ruling was based. [R. 317-326.] Coet does
not now dispute any of those facts. [See Coet's Brief, pp. 15-28.] The facts on which
summary judgment was based must therefore be accepted as true.
The only issue on this appeal is whether the Trial Court erred by ruling as a matter of
law, based on undisputed facts, that Coet waived and released its claims for attorney fees and
prejudgment interest under the Resolution Agreement.
B.

Summary Judgment Was Proper under the Clear and Unambiguous
Language of the Resolution Agreement

This appeal requires the Court to apply the clear and unambiguous release language
in Section 9 of the parties' Resolution Agreement. [See R. 74-75.]
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A release is a type of contract and may generally be enforced on the same grounds as
other contracts. Horganv. Industrial Design Corp., 657P.2d751,753 (Utah 1982). The law
favors the good faith settlement of claims, and the encouragement and preservation of such
settlements "constitute strong arguments for enforcing releases." Id. (citations omitted)
(affirming summary judgment based on release executed by the parties). See also, Berube
v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1039-40 (Utah 1989) (holding release relieved
defendants of liability for negligence claim and affirming summary judgment); American
Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. CCI Meek, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1186-87 (Utah 1996)
(affirming summary judgment based on unambiguous release); Otsuka Electronics (USA,
Inc.) v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937 P.2d 1274, 1279-82 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding
release barred counterclaims and affirming summary judgment).
In this case, the release language in the Resolution Agreement is clear and
unambiguous. [See R. 74-75.] It bars Coet's claims for interest and attorney fees as a matter
of law. The release language provides that "upon payment by Labrum" (which has been
done), "Coet... releases and forever discharges Labrum.. .from any and air claims and
causes of action "of whatever nature," including "all claims that relate in any way to the
lawsuit" and "any claims asserted or that could have been asserted" in the lawsuit,
"excepting from this release only such claims as to which there is not a unanimous
decision by the Evaluation Team" [R. 74 (emphasis added).]
The release language speaks for itself, and nothing more really needs to be said about
the release language. As a matter of law, it bars Coet's claims for attorney fees and interest.
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But, at the risk of overkill, Labrum further notes that several other provisions of the
Resolution Agreement support the Trial Court's summary judgment.
First, several provisions of the Agreement make it clear that the parties' claims were
limited to those specifically listed in the Resolution Agreement and that only those claims
specifically included in the Agreement and left unresolved by the Evaluation Team, together
with the legal questions relating to Obsolete Parts, would survive the release. For example,
Section 3 expressly stated that the parties' purpose in submitting their claims to the
Evaluation Team was to "resolv[e] all of the respective claims between the parties, with the
exception of whether either party is legally responsible to the other party for parts
obsolescence." [R. 76.] Further, in Section 2.f, the parties were required to, and did, list all
of their "additional claims," which the parties expressly agreed were "limited to" 12
enumerated items. [R.76-77.] And by Section 10, the parties were expressly precluded from
raising or asserting (in this lawsuit or otherwise) any claims for damages related to the Asset
Sale Agreement and the Closing, except for: (i) any accounting issues that are not resolved
by the Evaluation Team and (ii) any legal issues that must be resolved in order to achieve a
complete resolution of the accounting issues specifically addressed in this Agreement (i.e.,
the Obsolete Parts legal questions). [R. 74.]
In addition, the parties specifically and expressly reserved only one legal issue from
the effect of the release language, namely the legal issues surrounding Labium's Obsolete
Parts claim. [See R. 74-76,78, Resolution Agreement §§ 2.b, 3,9.] The express reservation
of this particular claim by implication excludes the reservation of all other claims, including
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Coet's claims for attorney fees and interest. This long-accepted doctrine of contract and
statutory interpretation is expressed in Latin by the legal maxim "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius'-tht expression of the one is the exclusion of the other. See generally 5 Margaret
N. Kniffin, Corbin on Contracts 315-16, § 24.28 (1998).
Extrinsic evidence can also be used to determine whether a contract is ambiguous.
Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, ^[7,78 P.3d 600 ("When determining whether a contract
term is ambiguous, the court is not limited to the contract itself."). "Relevant, extrinsic
evidence 'of the facts known to the parties at the time they entered the [contract]' is
admissible to assist the court in determining whether the contract is ambiguous." Id. (quoting
Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 11, % 39, 20 P.3d 287).
Considering the circumstances under which the Resolution Agreement was negotiated
and signed, it is even more clear that all claims, including claims for attorney fees, costs, and
interest were validly released according to the terms of the Resolution Agreement. For
example, by email letter dated May 12,2004 counsel for Labrum specifically informed Coet
that Labrum's intent in negotiating the terms of the Resolution Agreement was to require
"both parties to get everything on the table and resolved." [R. 263.] Moreover, Labrum's
counsel stated that "[i]f we are going to proceed, everything needs to be put on the table and
addressed or waived. The agreement I have drafted lists our issues, requires payment
according to the unanimous findings of the accountants, and provides for a release of all
other claims by both sides (except for certain issues related to parts obsolescence and any
issue with respect to which there is not a unanimous decision by the accountants)." [R. 263.]
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There can be no dispute that the intent and language of the Resolution Agreement
required both parties to identify and include "all" of their respective claims and
counterclaims in the Resolution Agreement. By express language of the Agreement, all other
claims were released and waived.
C.

As a Matter of Law, Claims that Are Not Expressly Preserved in a
Settlement Agreement Are Waived,

The Resolution Agreement was in fact a type of settlement agreement. By that
Agreement, the parties voluntarily settled claims by submitting them to the Evaluation Team
for consideration, and agreeing to abide by the Evaluation Team's conclusions.
There are many cases holding that a settling party waives any claims not expressly
preserved in a settlement agreement. For example, in Krumme v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc.,
238 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000), ten company executives participated in an Executive Permanent
Insurance ("EPI") Program. The EPI included a deferred compensation agreement that
allowed them to annually receive 30% of their final base salary after retirement. The EPI
agreement contained a fee-shifting provision that required the employer to pay the
executives' attorney fees in case of dispute. 238 F.3d at 135-36. A dispute arose after a
hostile takeover of the company. Nine of the executives opted to receive a lump sum
payment and signed a release of "all obligations," effective upon acceptance of the lump sum
payments. The payments were subsequently made. The executives then sued, seeking
(among other things) recovery of their substantial attorney fees pursuant to the EPI
agreement. Id. at 136-37. The court held that a broad, general release automatically includes
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a release of any obligation to pay attorney fees unless those fees are specifically and
expressly excepted from the release. Id. at 145. Because attorney fees were not expressly
reserved in the release, the executives' claims were barred. Id.; see also Estate ofGivens,
938 S.W.2d 679,681-82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding language in release such as "from any
and all liability," "of whatever name or nature," and "any other matter whatsoever involving
my relationship with [the Bank]" unambiguously included release of attorney fees); JanaRockConstr., Inc. v. New YorkStateDept Transp., 699N.Y.S.2d 528,529 (N.Y. S. Ct. App.
Div. 1999) (holding release unambiguously included release of interest on settlement amount,
notwithstanding reference to a future claim proceeding); Adams v. American Int'l Group,
Inc., 791 N.E.2d 26, 32 (111. Ct. App. 2003) (holding release of "any and all claims"
unambiguously included release of claims for pre-judgment interest).
In this case, the release unambiguously covers "any and all claims" of "whatever
nature" including "all claims that relate in any way to the lawsuit" and "any claims asserted
or that could have been asserted" in the lawsuit. The release carves out specific narrow
exceptions to the release, namely, claims as to which there is not a unanimous decision by
the Evaluation Team and legal issues relating to the claim for Obsolete Parts. The release
contains no exception for attorney fees or interest. Those claims therefore fall within the
expressed release provisions of the Resolution Agreement.
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D.

The Resolution Agreement Terms Were Not Conflicting.

Coet concedes on appeal that the Resolution Agreement is clear and unambiguous.
See Coet's Brief, p. 16. In a somewhat contradictory turn, Coet does argue that the
Resolution Agreement has conflicting provisions. See Coet's Brief, pp. 17-20. Coet states:
The [Resolution] Agreement did not appear to be ambiguous, but contained
provisions which conflicted, or were not in harmony, with other more specific
terms. . . . Admittedly, when viewed in isolation, Paragraph Nine's [of the
Resolution Agreement] plain language may lead to the conclusion that Coet's
claim for attorneys' fees and pre-judgment interest, as provided in the Asset
Sale Agreement may have been waived or released. On its face the
[Resolution] Agreement appears to limit Coet's claims. However, if the Court
considers all four corners of the [Resolution] Agreement, the Court will be
able to harmonize the facially conflicting terms.
Coet's Brief, pp. 17-18.
Coet fails to identify any term of the Resolution Agreement that is inconsistent with
the broad release provisions of Paragraph 9, making it difficult to comprehend how the
Resolution Agreement is allegedly in conflict with itself. It may be that Coet argues the
broad release provision in Paragraph 9 of the Resolution Agreement is in conflict with the
attorney fee provision of the Asset Sale Agreement. See Coet's Brief, p. 18. If that is Coet's
claim, then it fails to follow a reasonable line of logic. The very purpose of the Resolution
Agreement was to address and attempt to resolve all claims asserted under the Asset Sale
Agreement, including any claim for attorney fees. The parties agreed to: 1) identify all
claims and include them in the Resolution Agreement; 2) have the Evaluation Team address
all of the parties' claims, save only the legal issue of liability for Obsolete Parts; 3) be bound
by the Evaluation Team's unanimous conclusions; 4) fully release "any and all claims" "of
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whatever nature" upon payment of sums found be owed, save only those claims specifically
excepted from the release language. There is no logical argument that the broad release
language of the Resolution Agreement is somehow inconsistent with the attorney fee
provision of the Asset Sale Agreement.
Coet may also be arguing that Paragraph 9 of the Resolution Agreement is
inconsistent with other terms of the Agreement that refer to "accounting" issues. See Coet's
Brief, p. 19. Coet's argument is not entirely clear on this point, either. It is clear, however,
that Labrum insisted that "everything needs to be put on the table and addressed or waived"
[R. 263], and that the parties mutually agreed the very purpose of the Resolution Agreement
was to resolv[e] all of the respective claims between the parties." [R. 76.] It just so happens
that the only "non-accounting" issue submitted by either party was the issue of whether Coet
was legally liable for fraud or misrepresentation. That issue was expressly excepted from the
broad release provisions of Paragraph 9 and in other places in the Resolution Agreement.
[R. 74, 76.]
E.

The Stipulated Case Management Order Has No Bearing on Whether
Coet Waived its Claims for Attorney Fees and Interest.

Coet relies heavily on the Stipulated Case Management Order ("CMO") and Coet's
accompanying, but untrue, arguments that the Trial Court ordered, directed and supervised
the Evaluation and ceded its legal authority to the Evaluation Team. These arguments fail.
Coet repeatedly argues, for some unclear reason, that the Trial Court ordered, directed
and supervised the Evaluation process. That simply is not true. The CMO, by which the
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Court adopted the parties' Resolution Agreement, was a stipulated document. This is
demonstrated by its title- "Stipulated Case Management Order"-and the signatures of both
counsel immediately prior to the Court's signature. Moreover, the record demonstrates that
the Resolution Agreement was the parties' agreement, negotiated and drafted by the parties
for many months prior to any involvement by the Trial Court. [See R. 219-269.] The fact is
that the Court accommodated the parties' agreement to submit their claims to the Evaluation
Team, but it certainly did not require it, beyond approving the parties' stipulated order. And
there is absolutely no evidence in the record to support the untrue statement that the Trial
Court "directed, ordered, and supervised" the Evaluation in this case. See Coet's Brief, pp.
33,35. Coet's repeated reliance on the suggestion that the Court ordered and supervised the
Evaluation is badly misplaced.
More importantly, the CMO specifically provided that the parties would submit their
claims "consistent with the parties' letter agreement, a copy of which is attached [to this
CMO] as Exhibit A." [R. 85.] Thus, the CMO specifically deferred to the specific, governing
language of the Resolution Agreement. As a matter of law, the CMO could not, and did not,
resurrect fee and interest claims that were released pursuant to broad release provisions of
Paragraph 9 of the Resolution Agreement.
To the extent public policy comes into play in this case, it strongly supports Labrum' s
position. Litigants should be encouraged to resolve cases through alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms, and to resolve them to finality. In a case where the parties agreed
to put all their issues on the table so that everything could be resolved, and agreed to release
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and waive everything else, it would be extremely unfair to allow one of the parties to
subsequently return to the well and seek additional recovery on claims that were never
asserted during the alternative dispute resolution process. If this were allowed, subsequent
litigants would be strongly discouraged from engaging in alternative dispute resolution,
because there would be little hope of finality in any such process.
Finally, contrary to Coet's arguments, the Trial Court did not cede anything-legal
authority or otherwise-to the Evaluation Team. The parties, both represented by counsel,
voluntarily agreed to submit all of their claims to the Evaluation Team, save only the legal
issue of fraud or misrepresentation in connection with Obsolete Parts. It was by the parties5
expressed agreement, not court-ceded authority to decide legal issues, that all other claims
and issues were submitted to the Evaluation Team. It was by a clear and unambiguous
agreement of the parties that they had to either identify their claims in the Resolution
Agreement or expressly waive and release them.
Coet failed to include its alleged claims for attorney fees and interest anywhere in the
Resolution Agreement. Labrum entered into the Resolution Agreement with the expressed
expectation that all of the parties5 claims would be listed and evaluated by the Evaluation
Team, and that upon payment of amounts owed as determined by the Evaluation Team, "any
and all" claims of "whatsoever nature" would be released, except those claims expressly
reserved. Labrum sought to preclude the assertion of new and never-ending additional
claims by getting everything on the table and resolved once and for all. That is what the
parties bargained for and that is what the parties should get.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS WELL WITHIN ITS DISCRETION TO
DETERMINE THAT LABRUM WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY AT TRIAL
AND ENTITLED TO RECOVER ITS FEES.
The question of whether a party is the "prevailing party" for purposes of an attorney

fee award is left to the sound discretion of the Trial Court. See Carlson Distr. Co. v. Salt
Lake Brewing Co., 2004 UT App. 227, \ 16,95 P.3d 1171. The Trial Court's determination
is reviewed only for an "abuse of discretion." Id.
A "good starting point" for determining "prevailing party" status is the net judgment
rule. Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217,221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
However, trial courts also use a "flexible and reasoned approach," recognizing that
"mechanical application of... the net judgment rule could create absurd results." A.K.&R.
Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, f 11, 94 P.3d 270.
The Trial Court was well within its discretion when it denied Coet's claim for all
attorney fees and granted Labrum's claim for fees incurred after the May 13, 2005 release
date. Labium' s May 13 payment effected a general release of all of Coet's claims, including
a full release of any past claim for attorney fees. Coet's payment did not end this case,
however. Even after May 13, Coet continued to assert two claims related to the Asset Sale
Agreement, namely, its claim for payment for the 1992 Ford truck and its claim for payment
for oil and gas inventories. As a result, Labrum was forced to incur additional attorney fees
after May 13 to defend itself against Coet's claims and to assert its own claims.
Thus, the only relevant question is: who is the prevailing party and therefore entitled
to recover attorney fees and costs with respect to claims asserted after May 13, 2005? It is
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beyond dispute that Labrum was the prevailing party on all of those claims. All of Coet's
remaining claims against Labrum for breach of the Asset Sale Agreement were dismissed at
the trial. Labrum was awarded $11,455.26 on its counterclaim.
Labrum's position on this issue is consistent with the letter and spirit of both the Asset
Sale Agreement and the Resolution Agreement. The Asset Sale Agreement provided that the
prevailing party in any proceeding concerning the Asset Sale Agreement would be entitled
to recover attorney fees. [R. 416.] The Resolution Agreement acted as a partial modification,
or partial accord and satisfaction, of the Asset Sale Agreement. The Resolution Agreement,
together with Labrum's payment of the sums found owing by the Evaluation Team, effected
a full release and satisfaction of all claims that existed as of May 13, 2005, save only those
claims specifically excepted from the release. [R. 74-75.] After May 13, 2005, Coet
continued to pursue claims for breach of the Asset Sale Agreement on two issues. By doing
so, Coet forced Labrum to incur additional attorney fees after May 13, 2005, giving rise to
a new claim for attorney fees under Section 11.10 of the Asset Sale Agreement. The Trial
Court was well within its discretion in awarding these fees to Labrum, because it is
undisputed that Labrum is the prevailing party on these claims.
It is important to emphasize that Labrum did not claim, and was not awarded, any fees
or costs incurred prior to May 13,2005. Labrum acknowledged in the Trial Court that, along
with Coet, Labrum had waived and released any claim for attorney fees incurred prior to May
13, 2005. The Trial Court awarded to Labrum only those fees Labrum incurred after May
13, 2005. Because Coet forced Labrum to incur those fees on minor claims on which Coet
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ultimately lost, the Trial Court was well within its discretion when it determined Labrum was
the prevailing party and was entitled to recover fees after the effective date of the release.
Coet's policy argument that settlement agreements should be considered in
determining "prevailing party" status should not apply in this case, because Coet expressly
waived its claim for attorney fees and interest as part of the settlement. Coet cannot make
any policy argument or cite to any authority to support the argument that a litigant who
waives its claims for attorney fees as part of a settlement should be subsequently awarded its
fees because it "prevailed" in the settlement it obtained. Morever, as the Trial Court
correctly noted, the reasons litigants settle cases involve many diverse motives, making it
extremely unworkable for Trial Courts to try to figure out who "prevailed" in a negotiated
settlement. See R. 636.
Under the facts of this case, the Trial Court was well within its discretion when it
determined Labrum is the prevailing party. The parties started with a clean slate on May 13,
2005. It is undisputed that Labrum prevailed on every single issue litigated after that date.
III.

THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
THAT COET IS LIABLE FOR FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION.
Coet argues that Labrum failed to meet the evidentiary standard for the elements of

fraud. In particular, Coet attacks the Trial Court's findings that Coet made a material
misrepresentation that he did not have an Obsolete Parts problem and that Labrum acted in
reasonable reliance this misrepresentation. See Coet's Brief, p. 37.
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In making this argument, Coet bears a heavy burden. The issue of whether Coet made
a material misrepresentation is a question of fact. The issue of whether Labrum reasonably
relied on the misrepresentation is a question of fact. See Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143,
148-49 (Utah 1998) (whether plaintiff reasonably relied on misrepresentations is question
of fact). The Trial Court's findings cannot be overturned unless they are "clearly erroneous."
See, e.g., Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, f 15, 979 P.2d 338; Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
973 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). The Trial Court's findings must be
upheld unless they are "not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
First, Coet has miserably failed in its burden to marshal all of the evidence supporting
the Trial Court's findings. See, e.g., Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, f 7, 987 P.2d 588;
Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425,433 (Utah 1998). Coet fails to marshal any evidence relating
to the fact that Coet made a material misrepresentation, and only marshals part of the
evidence relating to Labrum's reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation.
It is an undisputed fact that Mr. Coet made a misrepresentation of fact to Labrum
about the extent of Coet's Obsolete Parts problem. [R. 674 at pp. 113, 128.] In marshaling
the evidence that Coet made a misrepresentation of fact, Coet cites only to Rachael Labrum's
testimony. Coet's Brief, p. 37. Danny Labrum's testimony supporting this fact was even
more compelling:
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A. [By Mr. Labrum] . . . I asked him if there was any Obsolete Parts, and he
says, "I don't have an obsolescence problem."
[R. 674 at p. 128.] Mr. Coet never denied making this misrepresentation, and the record is
completely devoid of any evidence controverting this fact.
The question of whether this representation was material is a classic fact question.
Evidence supporting the Trial Court's conclusions includes the following:
•

The Asset Purchase Agreement contained a specific term providing that the
purchase price for the assets would be reduced based on the volume of
"Obsolete Parts." [R. 43 L]

•

Labrum explained that if there were Obsolete Parts, "it's money that's just
sitting idle. You can't use it." [R. 674 at p. 130.]

•

Labrum had no access to any of Coet's computer systems prior to closing, and
had no method of checking inventory records on Coet's computers. [R. 674 at
pp. 116-18, 131.]

•

While Labrum conducted a physical count of parts in inventory prior to
closing, Coet had no method of determining which of the parts in inventory
were Obsolete Parts. [R. 674 at pp. 127-29.]

•

The fact that Danny Labrum asked whether there was an Obsolete Parts
problem demonstrates that it was an important issue to him. [See R. 674 at p.
129.]
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•

Labrum continued with the closing in reliance on Coet's representation. [R.
674 at pp. 129-30.]

Coet next attacks Labrum's reliance on Coet's misrepresentation. The evidence at
trial was sufficient to support a finding that Labrum's reliance was reasonable. For example,
the undisputed evidence demonstrated that, despite several hours of physically counting parts
in inventory, Labrum had no access to Coet's computers and had no method to determine
which of those parts were Obsolete Parts. [See R. 674 at pp. 116-18, 127-29, 131.] In
addition, Danny Labrum testified that the representation was important to him, and that he
proceeded forward with the closing in reliance on Coet's representation. [R. 674 at p. 130.]
Indeed, Labrum specifically relied on Coet's representation when he signed closing
statements indicating that no adjustment needed to be made to the purchase price based on
Obsolete Parts. [R. 674 at p. 130.]
Coet does not attack any other element of Labrum's claim for fraud and
misrepresentation. The evidence, carefully heard and considered by the Trial Court, fully
supports the Trial Court's findings. Because there is evidence in the record to support the
Trial Court's findings, they must be sustained on appeal.
IV.

THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING
THAT THE 1992 FORD TRUCK WAS IN INVENTORY AT THE TIME OF
CLOSING.
The Asset Sale Agreement provided:
Section 1.1. Assets to be Purchased and Sold. The assets (the "Assets") to
be purchased and sold hereunder relate to the Dealership and shall include, the
following:
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(b)
Used Vehicle Inventory. All used motor vehicles which are in
the Seller's inventory at the time of Closing which vehicles have been
previously titled.. ..
[R. 432-33.]
The issue at trial was whether the 1992 Ford truck was "in the Seller's inventory at
the time of Closing." The Trial Court found and ruled that it was. There was more than
sufficient evidence to support the Trial Court's finding.
In fact, the evidence left it undisputed that the 1992 Ford truck was in inventory at the
time of the Closing on November 14,2001. It is undisputed that Johnny Jessen delivered the
truck to the dealership at approximately 6:00 a.m. on November 13,2001, and that the truck
was physically present at Coet's dealership at the time of Closing. [See Statement of Facts
f j 11, 27, supra; R. 674 at pp. 85, 88, 92, 118-22.] On appeal, Coet even admits, 'There is
no dispute that the 1992 Ford pickup was on the dealership lot and included in the inventory
paperwork." See Coet's Brief, p. 39.
Although not entirely clear, Coet seems to base this appeal solely on the allegation that
Labium never paid for the truck. See Coet's Brief, pp. 38-41. The evidence at trial on this
point was disputed. For example, at the closing on November 13, 2001, both parties signed
a "Closing Statement." The Closing Statement provided for a reduction in the Purchase Price
of $495.00 based on the "Used Vehicle Inventory as of the Closing Date." [R. 353.] By this
document, the parties agreed that the value of the used car inventory was $290,275. [R. 353.]
It is undisputed that the Ford truck was part of the inventory as of the date of closing. It is
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also undisputed that Labrum paid the amount agreed upon by the parties for the used car
inventory.
More importantly, Coet's argument misses the mark. It is irrelevant whether each
used car in inventory was assigned a separate and definitive price. It is undisputed that the
parties' negotiated a purchase price for all of the "Assets" of the dealership, including all
used cars "in the Seller's inventory at the time of Closing." It is undisputed that the 1992
truck was in the Seller's inventory at the time of Closing. It is undisputed that the parties
both agreed that only a $495.00 adjustment would be made to the purchase price based on
the used cars in inventory at the time of Closing. [R. 353.]
Because there is sufficient evidence to sustain the Trial Court's finding that the truck
was in the Seller's inventory at the time of Closing, the Trial Court's ruling and judgment on
the 1992 truck issue must be sustained.
V.

LABRUM SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS FEES AND COSTS INCURRED ON
THIS APPEAL.
Both parties have asserted that the attorney fee provision of the Asset Sale Agreement

remains effective. Coet's appeal has forced Labrum to continue to incur costs and attorney
fees.
In addition to affirming the Trial Court's award of fees to Labrum, this Court should
enter an order that Labrum is entitled to recover all reasonable and necessary costs and fees
incurred since September 15,2006. September 15,2006 is the date of Labrum's motion for
fees in the Trial Court, and is the last day for which fees were awarded to Labrum. Labrum
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is entitled to recover the additional fees and costs it has been forced to incur since that date.
This Court should remand this case to the Trial Court for a determination of the amount of
those costs and fees.
CONCLUSION
Labrum respectfully requests that the Trial Court's Judgment be affirmed, and that
Labrum be awarded its costs and fees on appeal.
Dated this T_ day of August, 2007.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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ADDENDA
1.

Asset Sale Agreement (R. 411-433)

2.

Resolution Agreement (letter agreement dated 2/9/05) (R. 73-79)

3.

Evaluation Team Report (R. 104-106)

4.

Larry J. Coet Chevrolet Monthly Summary Report dated 10/31/01 (Trial
Exhibit D-12,R. 690)
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EXHIBIT 1
Asset Sale Agreement

Asset Sale Agreement
THIS ASSET SALE AGREEMENT (this 'Agreement") is made effective this
day of August, 2001 between LARRY J. COET CHEVROLET, PONTIAC, BUICK, INC., a
Utah corporation, whose address is 901 South Main, Heber City, Utah 84032 ("Seller"); and
LABRUM CHEVROLET PONTIAC BUICK, INC., a Utah corporation, whose address is
2003 West Brynn Circle, West Jordan, Utah 84088, ("Buyer").
RECITALS:
A.
Seller is the owner of certain assets used in the operation of "Larry J. Coet
Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick," a new and used motor vehicle dealership located at 901 South Main,
Heber City, Wasatch County, Utah. The Dealership is operated under a dealer agreement with
General Motors Corporation ("Manufacturer").
B.
Seller desires to sell to Buyer, and Buyer desires to purchase from Seller, certain
assets of Seller, subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
C.
The parties desire to set forth herein their entire agreement concerning the
purchase of non real property assets. This Agreement shall supersede all prior negotiations or
agreements between the parties, oral and/or written, concerning the subject matter of this
Agreement.
AGREEMENT:
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the mutual covenants and
undertakings of the parties hereto, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:
ARTICLE 1
SALE AND PURCHASE OF THE ASSETS
Section 1.1. Assets to be Purchased and Sold. The assets (the "Assets") to be purchased
and sold hereunder relate to the Dealership and shall include, the following:
(a)
New Vehicle Inventory. Seller's new automobile and truck inventory (the
"New Vehicle Inventory") as of the Closing (defined below), which shall include only those
new motor vehicles that have never been titled; that are considered new and unused in the
automobile sales industry; and whose ownership is evidenced by a Manufacturer's Statement of
Origin (an "MSO"). New Vehicle Inventory may include demonstrators only if undamaged with
odometer readings not exceeding Three Thousand (3,000) miles.
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(b)
Used Vehicle Inventory. All used motor vehicles which are in the Seller's
inventory at the time of Closing which vehicles have been previously titled. The used motor
vehicle inventory may include demonstrators if such demonstrators have been titled or have
odometer readings greater than Three Thousand (3,000) miles.
(c)
Sublet & Supplies. Sublet, gas, oil, grease, etc., shall be purchased as an
inventory item at current values, based upon a physical inventory which shall be taken
immediately prior to the Closing. No unusable or partially used items shall be purchased by
Buyer.
(d)
Parts and Accessories Inventory. The motor vehicle parts and accessories
inventory (the "Parts") of the Seller established by physical count as of the Closing, excluding
any and all obsolete parts. Obsolete parts ("Obsolete Parts") shall consist of the following: (1)
any part which is not included in the subject manufacturer's current parts pricing list; (2) any part
on which the seal has been opened or is materially damaged in any way; (3) any part which is
missing a portion or portions of its working mechanism(s) so that it would not be accepted for
return by its manufacturer; or (4) Parts in excess of a one hundred eighty (180) day supply. The
Parts may include motor vehicle parts and accessories manufactured or sold by Manufacturer as
well as those manufactured or sold by Manufacturer's distributors or other reputable third party
suppliers.
(e)
FF&E. The furniture, fixtures, tools and equipment (collectively, the
"FF&E") to be purchased by Buyer that are specified on attached Exhibit "A." Upon request
prior to Closing, Seller shall provide Buyer with all documentation and information in Seller's
possession or reasonably available to Seller evidencing the items and original costs for such
items. Buyer shall be entitled to take a physical inventory of the FF&E to assure that all such
items are accounted for and functional as of the Closing; provided, however, that no item shall be
omitted from the FF&E to be purchased by Buyer unless such item is designated as "Assets Not
Subject to the Asset Sale Agreement" as set forth on Exhibit "B." The FF&E must be in good
condition and good working condition, as the case may be.
(f)
Intangibles. The following intangible assets (the "Intangibles") of the
Seller: goodwill; the opportunity to acquire the dealer agreements with Manufacturer; the
opportunity to obtain the Seller's present telephone number(s) and Yellow Pages advertisements;
and the opportunity to acquire from Manufacturer any specialized displays used in connection
with the business of Seller.
(g)
Real Estate. Dealership real estate located at 901 South Main, Heber City,
Utah 84032, shall be purchased by DRL Real Estate, L.L.C., simultaneously with the Closing.
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Section 1.2
Purchase Price for the Assets. The purchase price (the "Purchase
Price") for the Assets shall be Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($350,000.00), as may be
adjusted at Closing pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.
(a)
New Vehicle Inventory. An inventory of new vehicles of the Dealership
shall be completed immediately prior to Closing. The actual cash value of new vehicles shall be
the dealer cost of such vehicle less manufacturer holdback advertising allowances, and/or
incentives received or due and payable on said vehicles. The manufacturer holdback advertising
allowances, and/or incentives received, or due and payable on the New Vehicle Inventory shall
remain the property of the Seller. Any additional equipment (add-ons) that have been installed at
dealer cost less any items at dealer cost that have been removed from said vehicles, shall be
added to or subtracted from the actual cash value of the New Vehicles. Buyer shall purchase the
New Vehicle Inventory at its actual cash value by paying said actual cash value of the New
Vehicle Inventory to Seller's flooring source at Closing.
(b) Parts. Based upon a physical inventory of Parts taken immediately prior to
the Closing, if the value of the then existing Parts is less than $68,000.00 , the Purchase Price
will be reduced to reflect the difference between $68,000.00 and valuation of the inventoried
parts and accessories. The Parts shall be valued at the listed price in the current price book for
Parts provided that said inventoried Parts are still in the original, unopened factory packaging
and are not Obsolete Parts. New, undamaged, returnable jobber Parts will be purchased based
upon the same criteria, priced at the current price book. The Parts physical inventory shall be
conducted at a time immediately prior to Closing by representatives of the Seller and Buyer. If a
resolution of the valuation of the Parts cannot be achieved then in that event an independent third
party appraiser mutually acceptable to the parties shall be engaged by the parties whose valuation
shall be binding on the parties. The cost of such shall be paid equally by the parties. The Parts
inventory (and the value thereof) as determined as of the Parts inventory date shall be increased
or decreased, as appropriate, to reflect purchases and sales of Parts from the Parts inventory date
to the date of Closing.
(c) Used Vehicle Inventory. An inventory of the used vehicles of the Seller shall
be completed immediately prior to Closing. Used motor vehicles shall be valued at a mutually
agreed upon price by Buyer and Seller as of the date of Closing using as a starting point the
wholesale Kelly Blue Book with "Options" valuation pertaining to such vehicles. If the parties
are not in agreement with the valuation as indicated in the Kelly Blue Book with Options
guidelines, then in that event, the parties shall select an independent third-party appraiser
mutually acceptable to the parties who shall appraise the used vehicles in question at their actual
cash value and the valuation rendered by such third-party appraiser shall be binding upon the
parties regarding the purchase price of such vehicles. The cost of such a third-party appraisal
shall be borne equally by the parties. Buyer shall purchase the Used Vehicle Inventory at its
actual cash value by paying said actual cash value of the Used Car Inventory to Seller's flooring
3
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source at Closing. The Asset Purchase Price will be increased or decreased depending upon
whether the value of the used cars purchased exceeds or is less than the inventory value on the
books of Seller.
(d)
FF&E. The furniture, fixtures, tools and equipment (Exhibit "A") shall be
purchased based upon an inventory and valuation conducted by Buyer and Seller. If any item(s)
set forth in Exhibit "A" are not part of the FF&E closing inventory conducted immediately prior
to Closing then a valuation shall be attributed to such item(s) and deducted from the purchase
price.
(e)
Purchase of New and Used Vehicle Inventory. The Buyer shall purchase
the New and Used Vehicle Inventory but only up to a maximum of $1,500,000.00, or greater as
may be agreed upon by the parties and Buyer's lender, holding the Seller harmless therefrom.
(f)
Termination Rights. Seller hereby assigns to Buyer Seller's termination
rights under its dealer agreements with Manufacturer, pursuant to which Buyer may have the
right to return to Manufacturer all unwanted parts purchased by Buyer pursuant to this
agreement. In that regard, the parties acknowledge that Manufacturer has made available to its
authorized dealers (including Seller) various incentive programs (the "Programs"), the intent of
which is to encourage those dealers to use parts available through Manufacturer and to minimize
the return of those parts.
Section 1.3
Service Contract Programs. All liabilities and obligations of Seller
pursuant to any extended service/warranty programs or the like (the "Service Contracts")
offered by Seller or an affiliated entity (but not Manufacturer) to Seller's customers are Seller's
sole responsibility, and Seller shall indemnify and hold harmless Buyer and its affiliated entities
from and against all costs, damages, actions and liabilities relating to the same. Notwithstanding
the foregoing, Buyer (at their sole option) may elect at the Closing to undertake in writing
responsibility for all or part of the Service Contracts, in which case the Purchase Price for the
Assets shall be reduced by an amount that is mutually acceptable to Buyer and to Seller and that
reasonably reflects the liability so undertaken by Buyer.
Section 1.4
Accounts Receivable. All accounts receivable (the "Accounts") of
Seller as of the Closing shall be excluded from the terms and conditions of this Agreement and
shall remain the sole property of Seller. Following the Closing, Buyer shall cooperate with the
then-owner of the Accounts to facilitate realization by such owner of the sums represented by the
Accounts.
Section 1.5 Accounts Payable. All liabilities and accounts payable of Seller shall
remain the sole responsibility of Seller unless Buyer agrees in writing to assume a liability or
account payable.
4
323866-2

Section 1.6 Statements of Origin. At the Closing, Seller shall provide and deliver to
Buyer an MSO for each vehicle in the New Vehicle Inventory, free and clear of all liens and
encumbrances whatsoever and titles for each used vehicle free and clear of all liens and
encumbrances whatsoever. The total purchase price for the New and Used Vehicle Inventory
shall not exceed One Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,500,000), unless otherwise
agreed by the parties and Buyer's lender in writing.
ARTICLE 2
PAYMENT OF THE PURCHASE PRICE
Section 2.1
Payment of the Purchase Price, The Purchase Price for the Assets as set
forth in Article 1 shall be paid as follows:
(a)

Cash payment of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars
($350,000.00) as adjusted pursuant to the terms of this
Agreement.

(b)

Earnest Money Deposit. The Buyers shall deliver to Snow,
Christensen & Martineau for deposit in the law firm's trust
account the sum of $5,000.00 at the time of the execution
of this Agreement. If the transaction set forth in this
agreement fails to close pursuant to the terms and
conditions of this Agreement, by virtue of the defalcation
or breach of the Agreement by the Seller, then and in that
event, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be refunded to the
Buyers in total. However, if the Closing of this Agreement
does not proceed as a result of Buyers' defalcation or
breach, then and in that event, $5,000.00 of the Earnest
Money Deposit shall be delivered to the Seller as liquidated
damages with no further claim against the Buyers.
ARTICLE 3
LIABILITIES

Section 3.1
Buyer Assumption of Liabilities. As of the Closing, the Buyer shall
assume responsibility for and pay the following liabilities of Seller:
(a)
Maintenance and Lease Agreements. From and after the date of Closing,
the Buyer shall assume and pay all maintenance agreements, service agreements and lease
5
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agreements relating to items included in the FF&E as set forth in Exhibit "C" attached hereto, to
the extent Buyer has agreed to such assumption within forty five (45) days after Seller has made
available to Buyer full and complete copies of all such maintenance, service and lease
agreements. From and after the Closing, Buyer shall indemnify and hold Seller harmless from
and against any and all claims, actions, proceedings, damages, costs and fees, (including
reasonable attorney's fees) arising from, or in any way attributable, to Buyer's failure to pay or
otherwise satisfy the terms and conditions of the maintenance agreements, service agreements
and/or lease agreements as set forth in Exhibit C, which Buyer has agreed in writing to assume.
Seller shall obtain all written consents to assignments as required and shall pay any fees or
penalties related to such assignments.
Section 3.2
Other Liabilities. Except those liabilities specifically assumed by the
Buyer pursuant to section 3.1 above, the Seller shall be responsible for and pay all obligations
and liabilities of the Seller, including but not limited to all liens and encumbrances of every kind
against the Assets and any other obligations, liabilities or claims by Seller's creditors which were
accrued and matured prior to the time of Closing. Under certain circumstances some liabilities
may be pro-rated between the parties as they agree in writing.
ARTICLE 4
DEALER AGREEMENT
Seller represents and warrants to Buyer that Seller operates the dealership under a dealer
agreement (the "Dealer Agreement") with Manufacturer, and that the Dealer Agreement is
current, in good standing and is not subject to cancellation or modification by reason of nonperformance by Seller. Seller is not aware of any conditions or facts which would prevent the
issuance of a new dealer agreement (the "New Dealer Agreement") to one or more of the
parties constituting Buyer on comparable terms as the existing Dealer Agreement. The issuance
to Buyer by Manufacturer of the New Dealer Agreement is a condition precedent to the
consummation of the terms of this Agreement and Buyer's obligation to perform hereunder.
Within two weeks immediately following Buyer's payment to Seller of the Earnest Money
Deposit (as described in section 2. 1 (a) above), Buyer shall file an application (and all related
papers reasonably known by Buyer to be required in connection with such application) with
Manufacturer for a New Dealer Agreement, which application shall present such individuals
(including, without limitation, their expertise and financial resources) in the best possible light.
Buyer shall diligently and expeditiously pursue approval of such application by Manufacturer,
and shall use Buyer's best, good faith efforts to have the New Dealer Agreement issued by 1
November 2001. Seller hereby informs Buyer that, to Seller's best knowledge, Manufacturer's
standard procedures for approval of new dealer agreements typically require between sixty (60)
and ninety (90) days.
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ARTICLE 5
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO CLOSING
Section 5.1 Conditions of Buyer's Obligation to Close. Buyer's obligation to
consummate the transactions contemplated by this Agreement and to make any payments is
subject to the fulfillment (or the waiver thereof by Seller in writing) of the following conditions
on or before the Closing:
(a)
Issuance of New Dealer Agreement. The New Dealer Agreement shall
have been issued to Danny R. Labrum, or a designee appointed by the Buyer by Manufacturer
under customary and usual terms and conditions generally contained in Manufacturer's standard
Dealer Agreement.
(b)
Condition of Title. Buyer has been reasonably assured that Buyer will
receive good, marketable and legal title to and right of possession of the Assets free and clear of
all liens and encumbrances whatsoever.
(c)
Manufacturers' Parts Programs. Seller shall have assigned to Buyer, at
Closing, its termination rights under the Dealer Agreement with Manufacturer and any and all of
Seller's rights (to receive payments of money or otherwise) under the Manufacturer's Parts
Programs.
(d)
Condition of Seller's Business. As of Closing, there shall not have been
any material adverse change in Seller's business and prospects not contemplated as of the date of
this Agreement. All representations made by Seller shall be essentially true, accurate and correct
as of Closing and there shall be no breach of any warranties or covenants made hereunder by
Seller.
(e)
Execution and Delivery of Documents. Seller shall have executed and
delivered to Buyer, through escrow at Closing, any and all documents reasonably required to
consummate the transactions contemplated by this Agreement.
(f)
Delivery of Records. Books. Etc. Seller shall have made available to Buyer
such records and books relative to the Assets as Buyer reasonably may request to effect an
orderly transfer of the Assets at time of Closing.
(g)
Delivery of Bills of Sale and/or Titles for the Assets. Seller shall have
executed and delivered to Buyer, at time of Closing, appropriate bills of sale, assignments and
other conveyance documents for the Assets, and shall execute and deliver appropriate documents
as required by the respective flooring lenders to transfer the MSO for each of the vehicles in the
New Vehicle Inventory and titles to the Used Vehicle Inventory to the Buyer or their assigns, all
free and clear of all liens and encumbrances.
7
323866-2

(h)
No Opposition. No suit, action, or proceeding shall be pending or
threatened at any time prior to or at the time of Closing before or by any court or governmental
body (a) seeking to restrain or prohibit, or to obtain damages or other relief in connection with,
the execution and delivery of this Agreement or the consummation of the transactions
contemplated hereby; or (b) that might materially and adversely affect the business or properties
or condition, financial or other, or results of operations of Seller.
(i)
Permits, Etc. Seller shall have assigned to Buyer, or Buyer shall have
obtained, all such permits, licenses, approvals, authorizations, variances, agreements, and
warranties from federal, state, and local governmental authorities, which Buyer shall, in the
exercise of its sole discretion, deem necessary or desirable for the operation by Buyer of the
business of Seller after the Closing.
(j)
Representations and Covenants. The representations and warranties of
Seller contained in this Agreement or otherwise made in writing by Seller or on Seller's behalf
pursuant hereto or otherwise made in connection with the transactions contemplated hereby shall
be true and correct at and as of the Closing with the same force and effect as though made on and
as of such date; each and all of the covenants, agreements, and conditions to be performed or
satisfied by Seller hereunder at or prior to the Closing shall have been duly performed or
satisfied; and Seller shall have furnished Buyer with such certificates and other documents
evidencing the truth of such representations and warranties and the performance and satisfaction
of such covenants, agreements, and conditions as Buyer shall have reasonably requested.
(k)
Instruments of Transfer. Seller shall have delivered to Buyer bills of sale,
assignments, deeds, and other instruments of transfer and assignment in accordance with the
provisions hereof, transferring to Buyer all of Seller's right, title, and interest in and to the
Assets, including the assigned contracts, to be transferred, sold, assigned, and conveyed by Seller
to Buyer pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement. The form of such instruments shall be
satisfactory in all reasonable respects to Snow, Christensen & Martineau, counsel to Buyer.
(1)
Financing. Buyer shall have obtained from Zions Bank and the SBA
financing in an amount and on terms and conditions satisfactory to Buyer, in its sole discretion.
(m)
Real Estate Closing. The Buyer and Seller shall have met all requirements
and simultaneously Close on the Real Estate pursuant to that certain Real Estate Purchase and
Sale Agreement between Seller and DRL Real Estate, L.L.C., of even date herewith.
Section 5.2
Conditions of Sellerfs Obligation to Close. Seller's obligation to
consummate the transactions contemplated by this Agreement are subject to the fulfillment (or
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the waiver thereof by Buyer in writing) of the following conditions on or before the Closing
Date:
(a)
Compliance with Obligations. Buyer shall have materially complied with
all of Buyer's obligations to be performed hereunder, including the payment of the Purchase
Price, on or before Closing.
(b)
Buyer Representations. All representations made hereunder by Buyer
shall be true, accurate and correct as of the Closing and there shall be no breach in the warranties
or covenants made hereunder by Buyer.
(c)
Delivery of Documents. Buyer shall have executed and delivered to Seller
any and all documents reasonably required to consummate the transactions contemplated by this
Agreement.
(d)
Payment of Purchase Price. Buyer shall have paid to Seller, through
escrow at Closing, the entire Purchase Price for the Assets as required pursuant to Article 2 of
this Agreement
ARTICLE 6
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
Section 6.1 Seller's Representations and Warranties. Seller hereby represents and
warrants to Buyer as follows, and covenants that thQ same are true and accurate as of the date
hereof and will remain true and accurate as of the Closing:
(a)
Ownership of the Assets. Seller is the owner of good and marketable title
to the Assets; the Assets are (or will be at the Closing) free and clear of all liens, debts, adverse
claims, obligations or encumbrances of every kind; and Seller has the unconditional right to sell,
convey and transfer the Assets to Buyer as contemplated by this Agreement.
(b)
Binding Agreement. Upon execution and delivery hereof and at the
Closing, this Agreement and the obligations contemplated herein shall be legal, valid and
binding obligations of Seller and shall be enforceable against Seller in accordance with their
respective terms.
(c)
Other Agreements. Except as herein otherwise provided, the execution
and delivery of this Agreement and the consummation of the transactions provided for herein
will not result in a material breach of any term or provision of, or constitute a default or permit
acceleration of maturity under, any indenture, mortgage, deed of trust, security agreement,
pledge agreement, loan agreement, or other agreement, document or instrument to which Seller
9
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is a party or by which Seller is bound which would affect the Assets or prevent or impair the
consummation of this Agreement or the transfer of the Assets to Buyer as contemplated herein.
(d)
Suits and Proceedings. There are no suits or proceedings pending or
threatened in any court or before any administrative board, commission, or by any federal, state
or other governmental department or agency, which directly or indirectly affect or involve Seller
and (a) which would materially, adversely affect the Assets, or (b) which, if determined
adversely, would have a material adverse effect on the transactions contemplated by this
Agreement or the business prospects of the Dealership.
(e)
Third Party Approvals. Except as otherwise specified herein, no consents
or approvals of any third party or parties are required prior to the execution, delivery and
performance by Seller of this Agreement and the other documents contemplated hereby.
(f)
No Material Adverse Changes. Since the date of this Agreement and prior
to the Closing, there has not and will not have been:
(1)

Any material adverse change in the Assets;

(2)
Any sale or any other disposition of any material part of the Assets
except in the ordinary course of business of the Dealership;
(3)
Any damage, destruction, or casualty loss (not covered by
insurance) materially and adversely affecting the Assets.
(4)

Any other material event or condition adversely affecting the

Assets.
(g)
Taxes. All taxes, charges and assessments on the Assets or the Dealership
of any type or character which have or will become due and payable prior to the Closing will
have been paid in full by Seller on or prior to such date.
(h)
Defaults/Breaches. Seller has in all material respects complied with,
observed and performed all of its obligations, and is not in default or breach (or would not be in
default or breach with the lapse of time or the giving of notice or both) under, any agreement or
commitment (oral or written) to which Seller is a party and by which the Assets are bound.
(i)
Organization and Corporate Power. Seller is a corporation duly
organized, validly existing, and in good standing under the laws of its jurisdiction of
incorporation and is duly qualified and in good standing as a foreign corporation in each other
jurisdiction in which it owns or leases properties, conducts operations, or maintains a stock of
10
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goods, with full power and authority (corporate and other) to carry on the business in which it is
engaged and to execute and deliver and carry out the transactions contemplated by this
Agreement.
(j)
Financial Statements. Seller has delivered to Buyer consolidated balance
sheets of Seller as at the close of its fiscal year for each of the three years ending December
1998, 1999 and 2000, respectively, and interim balance sheet for the six (6) months ending June
30, 2001, together with related statements of operations, statements of changes in stockholders'
equity, and statements of cash flows for the respective years then ended.
The financial statements specified above, including in each case the notes to such
financial statements, are hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as the "Financial
Statements." All of the Financial Statements are true, correct, and complete, have been prepared
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles consistently followed throughout
the periods (except as set forth in such notes or statements) and fairly present the financial
condition of Seller and the results of its operations as at the dates thereof and throughout the
periods covered thereby. The Financial Statements reflect or provide for all claims against, and
all debts and liabilities of, Seller, fixed or contingent, as at the dates thereof, and there has not
been any change between the date of the most recent Financial Statements and the date of this
Agreement that has materially or adversely affected the business or properties or condition or
prospects, financial or other, or results of operations of Seller, and no fact or condition exists or
is contemplated or threatened, which might cause any such change at any time in the future.
(k)
Personal Property. Seller owns and has good and marketable title to all
the tangible and intangible Personal Property and assets, other than the assets referred to in the
Exhibit C, reflected upon the most recent balance sheet included in the Financial Statements or
used by Seller in its business if not so reflected, free and clear of all mortgages, liens,
encumbrances, equities, claims, and obligations to other persons, of whatever kind and character,
except as set forth in the Exhibit C. None of the fixed assets and machinery and equipment is
subject to contracts of sale, and none is held by Seller as lessee or as conditional sales vender
under any lease or conditional sales contract and none is subject to any title retention agreement,
except as set forth in the Exhibit C. The fixed assets and machinery and equipment, taken as a
whole, are in a state of good repair and maintenance and are in good operating condition;
inventory is up to normal commercial standards and no inventory that is obsolete or
unmarketable is reflected in the most recent balance sheets included in the Financial Statements.
Upon the sale, assignment, transfer, and delivery of the Assets to Buyer hereunder, there will be
vested in Buyer good and marketable title to the tangible and intangible personal property
constituting a part thereof, free and clear of all mortgages, liens, encumbrances, equities, claims,
and obligations to other persons, of whatever kind and character, except for the rights of third
persons arising under contracts for the sale of inventory in the ordinary course of business, each
of which is listed in the Exhibit C.
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(Y)
Ordinary Course of Business. Seller, from the date of the balance sheet
contained in the most recent Financial Statements to the date hereof,

(1)
has operated its business in the normal, usual, and customary
manner in the ordinary and regular course of business;
(2)
has not sold or otherwise disposed of any of its properties or assets,
other than inventory sold in the ordinary course of business;
(3)

except in each case in the ordinary course of business,
(a)

has not amended or terminated any outstanding lease,

(b)

has not incurred any obligations or liabilities (fixed,

contract, or agreement,

contingent, or other), and
(c) has not entered any commitments;
(4)
has not made any transactions outside the ordinary course of
business in its inventory or any additions to its property or any purchases of machinery or
equipment, except for normal maintenance and replacements;
(5)
has not mortgaged, pledged, or subjected to lien or any other
encumbrances, any of its assets, tangible or intangible;
(6)
has not sold or transferred any tangible asset or cancelled any debts
or claims except in each case in the ordinary course of business;
(7)
has not entered into any other transaction or transactions that
individually or in the aggregate are material to Seller, other than in the ordinary course of
business.
(m)
Litigation and Compliance with Laws. Exhibit D contains a brief
description of all litigation or legal or other actions, suits, proceedings, or investigations, at law
or in equity, or before any federal, state, municipal, or other governmental department,
commission, board, agency, or instrumentality, domestic or foreign, in which Seller or any of its
officers or directors, in such capacity, is engaged, or, to the knowledge and belief of Seller, with
which Seller or any of its officers or directors is threatened in connection with the business or
affairs or properties or assets of Seller. Seller is in compliance with all laws and governmental
12
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rules and regulations, domestic and foreign, and all requirements of insurance carriers, applicable
to its business or affairs or properties or assets, including, without limitation, those relating to
environmental protection, water or air pollution, and similar matters.
(n)
Environmental Matters. To the best of Seller's knowledge (but without
having undertaken any independent inquiry), the Dealership and Property is not in violation of
any federal, state or local law, ordinance or regulation relating to industrial hygiene or to the
environmental conditions on, under or about the Property, including, but not limited to, soil and
groundwater condition. During the time in which Seller has owned the Property, neither Seller
nor, to the best of Seller's knowledge, any third party has released onto, under, about or from the
Property any Hazardous Materials. For purposes of this Agreement, "Hazardous Materials" shall
include substances defined as "hazardous substances," "hazardous materials," "hazardous
wastes," "retrograde material," "contaminant," "pollutant," "toxic substances" or the like in the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 9601. et seq.; the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1901, et seq.;
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq.; the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq.; the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seq.;
the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.; the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (33
U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.; the Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.; the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (42 U.S.C. § 11001 et seq.); A.R.S.
§ 549-201(16), 49-901(3), and 49-921(5); and in the regulations adopted pursuant to such laws;
and any substance or material which has been determined by any state, federal or local
governmental authority with jurisdiction over the Property to be capable of posing a risk of
injury to health or safety.
(o)
Extraordinary Events. From the end of its most recent fiscal year to the
date hereof, neither the business nor properties of the business have been materially and
adversely affected in any way as the result of any fire, explosion, accident, casualty, labor
disturbance, requisition, or taking of property by any governmental body or agency, flood,
embargo, or Act of God or the public enemy, or cessation, interruption, or diminution of
operations, whether or not covered by insurance.
(p)
Material Information.
Neither the Financial Statements nor this
Agreement (including the Schedules and Exhibits hereto) nor any certificate or other information
or document furnished or to be furnished by either Seller to Buyer contains or will contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omits or will omit to state a material fact required to be
stated herein or therein or necessary to make the statements herein or therein not misleading.
(q)
Continuing Representations.
The representations and warranties of
Seller herein contained (a) relating to non tax matters shall survive the Closing for a period of
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one year and (b) relating to tax matters shall survive the Closing for the applicable statute of
limitations.
Section 6.2 Buyer's Representations and Warranties. Buyer hereby represents and
warrants to Seller as follows, and covenants that the same are true and accurate as of the date
hereof and will remain true and accurate as of the Closing Date:
(a)
Binding Agreement. Upon execution and delivery hereof and at the
Closing, this Agreement and the obligations contemplated herein shall be legal, valid and
binding obligations of the Buyer and shall be enforceable against Buyer in accordance with their
respective terms.
(b)
Organization and Corporate Power.
Buyer is a corporation duly
organized, validly existing, and in good standing under the laws of its jurisdiction of
incorporation and is duly qualified and in good standing as a foreign corporation in each other
jurisdiction in which it owns or leases properties, conducts operations, or maintains a stock of
goods, with full power and authority (corporate and other) to carry on the business in which it is
engaged and to execute and deliver and carry out the transactions contemplated by this
Agreement.
(c)
Due Authorization; Effect of Transaction. No provisions of the Certificate
of Incorporation or Bylaws of Buyer, or of any agreement, instrument, or understanding, or any
judgment, decree, rule, or regulation, to which Buyer is a party or by which Buyer is bound, has
been or will be violated by the execution and delivery by Buyer of this Agreement or the
performance or satisfaction of any agreement or condition herein contained upon its part to be
performed or satisfied, and all requisite corporate and other authorizations for such execution,
delivery, performance, and satisfaction have been duly obtained. Upon execution and delivery,
this Agreement will be a legal, valid, and binding obligation of Buyer and Stockholder,
enforceable in accordance with its terms. Buyer is not in default in the performance, observance,
or fulfillment of any of the terms or conditions of its Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws.
(d)
Other Agreements. Except as herein otherwise provided, the execution and
delivery of this Agreement and the consummation of the transactions provided for herein will not
result in a material breach of any term or provision of, or constitute a default or permit
acceleration of maturity under, any indenture, mortgage, deed of trust, security agreement,
pledge agreement, loan agreement, or other agreement or instrument to which Buyer is a party
or by which Buyer is bound which would impair the consummation of this Agreement.
(e)
Suits and Proceedings. There are no suits or proceedings pending or
threatened in any court or before any administrative board, commission, or by any federal, state
or other governmental department or agency, which directly or indirectly affect or involve Buyer
14
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and which, if determined adversely, would have a material adverse effect on the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement.
(f)
Defaults/Breaches. Buyer has in all material respects complied with,
observed and performed all of its obligations, and is not in default or breach (or would not be in
default or breach with the lapse of time or the giving of notice or both) under, any agreement or
commitment (oral or written) to which Buyer is a party.
ARTICLE 7
CONDUCT OF SELLER'S BUSINESS PENDING THE CLOSING
Section 7.1. Conduct of Seller's Business Pending the Closing. Pending the Closing,
Seller will do the following:
(a)
Conduct of Business. Seller's business shall be conducted only in the
ordinary and usual course and substantially in accordance with its prior business practices, with a
view to maintaining the goodwill, the Assets, Seller's customer relationships and its business
reputation.
(b)
Employees. If requested by the Buyer, Seller shall use its best efforts to
cause the present employees, as selected by Buyer, to accept employment with Buyer after the
Closing. Buyer shall not, however, have any obligation to offer employment to any employee of
Seller.
(c)
Employee Compensation. From the date hereof to the Closing Date, Seller
shall not engage or employ any new employees except in the normal course of business or
increase the rate of compensation payable, or to become payable, to any present employee, or
pay any bonus or extraordinary compensation to any such employee, other than normal pay
increases, bonuses and other compensation practices of Seller in the normal course of business.
Section 7.2. Access to Information, Etc.
(a)
Access to Information Pending. Pending the Closing, Seller shall provide
to Buyer (and Buyer's counsel, accountants and other representatives), without charge, full and
complete access (in such manner so as not to unreasonably interfere with the normal conduct of
Seller's business) to the books, records and information of Seller concerning the Assets and
Seller's business which is reasonably necessary for the orderly transfer of the Assets and the
consummation of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement.
(b)
Approvals. If required, Buyer and Seller will promptly and expeditiously
make all appropriate filings or applications with third parties (including, without limitation, the
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application for the New Dealer Agreement), give all notices concerning the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement, and will cooperate with one another in developing and
presenting any data or information necessary in connection therewith.
(c)
Prompt Notice of Events. Pending Closing, (1) Seller shall give Buyer
prompt notice of any material developments affecting the Assets, and (2) Seller and Buyer shall
give prompt notice to each other of the occurrence of any event which would cause any of the
representations made by Seller or by Buyer to be untrue in any material respect.
ARTICLE 8
CLOSING
The Closing of the transactions contemplated hereby (the "Closing") shall take place at
Escrow Offices, or such other location as mutually agreed to by the parties, as provided in the
Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement, on the first to occur of (1) within a reasonable time as
agreed to by the parties after the New Dealer Agreement is confirmed in writing to the Buyer by
the Manufacturer as required herein, or (2) November 15, 2001, or at such other time, date and/or
place as the parties mutually may designate in writing. Although this Agreement is intended to
be executed and delivered in advance of the Closing, final closing, consummation and
completion hereof shall remain conditional upon satisfaction or written waiver of the conditions
precedent set forth in this Agreement. The Closing may be extended by Buyer, in Buyer's
discretion, for up to an additional ninety (90) days beyond 15 November 2001 to allow time for
issuance of the New Dealer Agreement, provided that the Buyer theretofore have used its best,
diligent, good-faith efforts to timely perform all of Buyer's obligations in connection with such
issuance but, despite such diligence by Buyer, the New Dealer Agreement remains unissued as of
15 November 2001.
ARTICLE 9
DEFAULT
If either party fails to perform any of its obligations hereunder and such condition is not
cured within ten (10) days after written notice thereof by the other, such party shall be in default
hereunder and the non-defaulting party shall be entitled to proceed at law and in equity to
enforce its rights under this Agreement. Buyer's rights shall include, without limitation, the right
to seek specific performance of this Agreement. Seller's rights shall include, without limitation,
the right to retain the portion of the Earnest Money Deposit as set forth in Paragraph 2.1(b) of
this Agreement as liquidated damages. The parties recognize and agree that, due to the fluidity of
the motor vehicle dealership market generally and the unique nature of the Dealership, the full
extent of Seller's damages in the event of Buyer's breach of its obligation to close this transaction
is difficult or impossible to measure, and that the Earnest Money Deposit represents the parties'
best, good-faith estimate of Seller's damages arising from any such breach by Buyer.
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ARTICLE 10
ACQUISITION OF NEW VEHICLES AFTER CLOSING
The Buyer acknowledges that the President of the Seller, Larry J. Coet, shall have the
unconditional right to purchase from the Buyer by special order from the manufacturer one
motor vehicle every other year commencing on the date of Closing, said vehicles to be purchased
at the Buyer's triple net cost of such vehicles plus dealer's preparation charges. Such vehicles
must be purchased for personal use only and not for resale. The term of the Seller's rights to
purchase new vehicles from the Buyer shall terminate ten years immediately following the
Closing Date. Such vehicles shall not be models with limited production without the approval of
Buyer.
ARTICLE 11
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Section 11.1. Survival of Representations and Warranties. The respective obligations
of Buyer and Seller hereunder and all representations and warranties made in this Agreement, all
exhibits hereto, and all certificates and documents delivered pursuant hereto, shall survive the
Closing.
Section 11.2. Binding Agreement. This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall
inure to the benefit of the successors and assigns of the respective parties hereto. Buyer's
obligations hereunder shall be the joint and several obligations of all of the parties who comprise
Buyer from time to time.
Section 11.3. Captions. The headings used in this Agreement are inserted for reference
purposes only and shall not be deemed to define, limit, extend, describe, or affect in any way the
meaning, scope or interpretation of any of the terms or provisions of this Agreement or the intent
hereof.
Section 11.4. Counterparts. This Agreement may be signed in any number of
counterparts with the same effect as if the signatures upon any counterpart were upon the same
instrument. All signed counterparts shall be deemed to be one original.
Section 11.5. Severability. The provisions of this Agreement are severable, and should
any provision hereof be void, voidable, unenforceable or invalid, such void, voidable,
unenforceable or invalid provision shall not affect the other provisions of this Agreement.
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Section 11.6. Waiver of Breach. Any waiver by either party of any breach of any kind
or character whatsoever by the other, whether such be direct or implied, shall not be construed as
a continuing waiver of, or consent to, any subsequent breach of this Agreement.
Section 11.7. Cumulative Remedies. The rights and remedies of the parties hereto shall
be constmed cumulatively, and none of such rights and remedies shall be exclusive of, or in lieu
or limitation of, any other right, remedy or priority allowed by law.
Section 11.8. Amendment This Agreement may not be modified except by an
instrument in writing signed by the parties hereto.
Section 11.9. Interpretation. This Agreement shall be interpreted, construed and
enforced according to the substantive laws of the state of Utah. Any disputes arising as a result
of the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be resolved in a Court situated in the State of
Utah.
Section 11.10. Attorneys' Fees. In the event any action or proceeding is taken or brought
by either party concerning this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, whether such sums are expended with or without suit, at
trial, on appeal or in any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding.
Section 11.11. Notice. All notices provided for herein shall be in writing and shall be
given by first class mail, certified or registered, postage prepaid, addressed to the parties at their
respective addresses set forth above or at such other address(es) as may be designated by a party
from time to time in writing.
Section 11.12. Brokers. Seller represents and warrants to Buyer that no broker or finder
acted for it or is entitled to any fee or commission in respect of the transactions contemplated
hereby. Seller shall indemnify and hold Buyer harmless in respect of any breach of the foregoing
representation and warranty. Similarly, Buyer represents and warrants to Seller that no broker or
finder acted for Buyer or is entitled to any fee or commission in respect of the transactions
contemplated hereby. Buyer shall indemnify and hold Seller harmless in respect of any breach of
the foregoing representation and warranty.
Section 11.13. Time of Essence. Time is of the essence to this Agreement.
Section 11.14. Costs. All costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by each
party in conjunction with this Agreement shall be paid by the party which has incurred such costs
and expenses.
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Section 11.15. Assignment Buyer may freely assign his rights, and delegate his duties,
under this Agreement, provided that no such assignment shall relieve Buyer of the ultimate
performance of his obligations hereunder.
Section 11.16. Interpretation. This Agreement is the result of arm's length negotiations
between, and the collaborative efforts of, sophisticated businessmen. Consequently, this
Agreement shall be interpreted in an absolutely neutral fashion, with no regard to the identity of
the "drafter" of this Agreement.
DATED effective the date first written above.
SELLER:
LARRY J. COET PONTIAC CHEVROLET BUICK,
INC., a Utah corporation

By:

-"^/fssLA-

9°V

LARRY J. COET^ President
BUYER:
LABRUM CHEVROLET PONTIAC BUICK, INC.,
Utah corporation

D M N Y R. LABRUM, President
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Exhibit "A" to
Asset Sale Agreement
FURNITURE, FIXTURES, TOOLS, AND EQUIPMETS
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Exhibit "B" to
Asset Sale Agreement
ASSETS NOT SUBJECT TO THE ASSET SALE AGREEMENT
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Exhibit ffC" to
Asset Sale Agreement
EQUIPMENT OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY BUYER
1. Parts Inventory and
Catalogue Inventory System
and Equipment Use Agreement dated
April 24, 2001

Lessor: Bell & Howell
1909 Old Mansfield Road
Wooster, Ohio

2. ADP Computer Software
Lease Agreement dated May 26, 1999

Lessor: ADP Leasing
99 Jefferson Rd
Sippany, N.J. 07054-0449

3. B&G use of equipment
Agreement dated August 9, 1999

Kenz & Leslie Distributing Co., Inc.
PO Box 1066
Arvada, CO 80001-1066

4. Crus Oil - use of equipment
Agreement dated March 15, 2001

Crus Oil, Inc.
2260 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84415-2631

Lucent Technologies Maintenance
Agreement for telephone system dated
March 15, 2001

Lucent Technologies
169 Mountain Way Drive, #107
Orem, Utah 84058

ADT Fire & Alarm Service Agreement
Dated June 14, 1996

ADT Security Services, Inc.
836 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
PO Box 65525
Salt Lake City, Utah 84165

7. Aramark - Uniforms
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EXHIBIT "D" To
Asset Purchase Agreement
NONE
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EXHIBIT 2
Resolution Agreement Letter dated February 9, 2005
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February 9, 2005
Writer's Direct Number.

(801) 322-9144

Gary R. Howe, Attorney
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Re:

Coet Chevrolet v. Labrum Chevrolet et al.;
Letter of Understanding Concerning Evaluation of Claims

Dear Gary:
This letter will set out the terms of our understanding and agreement with respect to an attempt
to resolve disputes between Larry J. Coet Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc.("Coet") and Labrum Chevrolet
Pontiac Buick, Inc. ("Labrum"). All terms not otherwise defined in this letter shall have the meaning
given them in the Asset Sale Agreement between the parties.
1. Composition of the Evaluation Team. Coet and Labrum shall each choose a certified public
accountant who, working as the co-equal of the individual selected by the other party (hereinafter the
"Evaluation Team"), shall conduct an evaluation of the various claims of the respective parties
("Evaluation"). Coet designates Becky Taylor, and Labrum designates Steven Racker, as Evaluation
Team members. Ms. Taylor and Mr. Racker signify their acceptance of these appointments by signing
below.
2. Scope of Work. The Evaluation shall comprise the following tasks:
a.
Review and Analysis of Used Vehicle Inventory Claims. With reference to the
Asset Sale Agreement, the Evaluation Team shall determine the total actual cash value of the Used Vehicle
Inventory as of November 15, 2001. The Evaluation Team shall discuss, review and analyze the parties'
respective claims with respect to Used Vehicle Inventory, and endeavor to arrive at a consensus as to the
total value of such claims, whether or not such amounts have been paid as agreed upon by the parties, and
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whether either of the parties owes the other party any amount with respect to such claims and, if so, the
amount owed. Among other potential issues, Coet claims that on November 15, 2001, Labrum asserted
a claim against Coet for the purchase of the Used Vehicle Inventory in the amount of $41,470.00, which
Coet claims was paid in full on November 15, 2001. Coet claims that the amount owed by Labrum for
the purchase of the Used Vehicle Inventory is $46,715.00.
b.
Parts. With reference to the Asset Sale Agreement, the Evaluation Team shall
determine the dollar value of parts in inventory as of November 15, 2001 that were Obsolete Parts (as
defined in the Asset Sale Agreement), as well as the parts in inventory as of November 15, 2001 that were
not Obsolete Parts. The Evaluation Team shall not endeavor to determine whether either party owes any
sum to the other party based on parts obsolescence, but shall limit the Evaluation to a determination of
the value of Obsolete Parts and non-Obsolete Parts as of November 15, 2001.
c
Additional Expenses Agreed to at Closing. The Evaluation Team shall discuss,
review and analyze the parties' respective claims with regard to asphalt paving, balance of the ADP
contract, computer acquisition, and payment of 50% of the employee medical plan payment for November
2001. The Evaluation Team shall endeavor to arrive at a consensus as to the total value of such claims,
whether or not such amounts have been paid as agreed upon by the parties, and whether either of the
parties owes the other party any amount with respect to such claims and, if so, the amount owed.
d.
Interest from Delayed Pay Off. The Evaluation Team shall discuss, review and
analyze the parties' respective positions relating to claims for interest expense due to an alleged delayed
pay off on the real estate and new and used car flooring lines. The Evaluation Team shall endeavor to
arrive at a consensus as to the total value of such claims, whether or not such amounts have been paid as
agreed upon by the parties, and whether either of the parties owes the other party any amount with respect
to such claims and, if so, the amount owed.
e.
New Vehicle Inventory. With reference to the Asset Sale Agreement, the
Evaluation Team shall determine the total actual cash value of the New Vehicle Inventory as of November
15, 2001. The Evaluation Team shall discuss, review and analyze the parties' respective claims with
respect to Used Vehicle Inventory, and endeavor to arrive at a consensus as to the total value of such
claims, whether or not such amounts have been paid as agreed upon by the parties, and whether either
of the parties owes the other party any amount with respect to such claims and, if so, the amount owed.
Among other potential issues, Coet now claims that Labrum asserted that Coet owed Labrum the sum
of $27,263.31, which Coet claims was paid to Labrum on November 15, 2001. Coet now claims it is
owed $32,911.65.
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f.
Other Claims. The Evaluation Team shall discuss, review and analyze the
following additional claims of the parties and the parties' respective positions with respect to such claims.
The Evaluation Team shall endeavor to arrive at a consensus as to the total value of all such claims,
whether or not such amounts have been paid as agreed upon by the parties, and whether either of the
parties owes the other party any amount with respect to such claims and, if so, the amount owed. Such
claims are limited to the following:
i)

Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $31.31 for interest on GMAC
funding paid to Coet's account.

ii)

Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $7,618 for warranty claims and
predelivery inspections.

iii)

Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $120.06 in fuel credits.

iv)

Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $3,045.16 in GM floor plan
interest.

v)

Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $7,600.92 for GM holdbacks.

vi)

Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $27.04 for repairs for Joe Rush.

vii)

Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $497.81 for American Express
payments

viii)

Labrum claims Coet owes Labrum approximately $232.37 for parts purchased from
GM

ix)

Coet claims Labrum owes Coet for a 1992 Ford Three Quarter Ton pickup truck,
VIN 2PTHF26M2NCA2221, which Coet claims was a used vehicle taken in on
trade prior to the closing and that the underlying lien was paid off by Coet and the
vehicle sold by Labrum. Coet claims the dollar amount of the trade-in allowance
is $4,300.00.

x)

Coet claims Labrum owes Coet for gas and oil inventory in existence as of the date
of closing in the amount of $6,076.00.

/ \
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xi)

Coet claims Labrum owes Coet for parts charged to Coet's GM Open Account
beginning November 15,2001 through December 27,2001 in the amount of $8,573.41.

xii)

Coet claims Labrum owes Coet for other charges on GM Open Account from
November 28, 2001 through January 17, 2002 in the amount of $3,339.33.

3- Objective of Evaluation. The Evaluation is intended by Coet and Labrum to be, and shall be
conducted by the Evaluation Team as, an independent examination, assessment, and application of the
relevant provisions of the Asset Sale Agreement and related documents, for the purpose of resolving all
of the respective claims between the parties, with the exception of whether either party is legally
responsible to the other party for parts obsolescence.
4. Reference Resources. In conducting the Evaluation, the Evaluation Team shall have access
to and shall rely on, the Asset Sale Agreement, related documents, and such books and records as Coet
and Labrum, or either of them, (i) actually utilized to establish the Used Vehicle Inventory actual cash
value for purposes of the Asset Sale Agreement and (ii) such additional documents, records, and books
of account that Coet and Labrum may provide to the Evaluation Team. In addition, the Evaluation Team
may, in its discretion, consult with such persons as members of the Evaluation Team shall deem
reasonable in furtherance of arriving at a consensus on the issues set forth above.
5. Methodology of Evaluation. The Evaluation Team shall carry out its tasks as a two-member
team, and shall conduct such consultations with Coet or Labrum or their respective representatives as the
members of the Evaluation Team shall deem reasonable in furtherance of arriving at a consensus on the
issues set forth above, including, without limitation, joint or separate consultations with either Coet or
Labrum. The Evaluation Team shall employ such skill, due diligence, methods, practices, procedures,
and tests as certified public accountants customarily use in an engagement of similar scope and
complexity.
6. Terms of Engagement. Coet shall be solely and separately responsible and liable for payment
of any fees incurred or charged by the accountant designated by him. Labrum shall be solely and
separately responsible and liable for payment of any fees incurred or charged by the accountant designated
by him.
7. Deadline for Results of Evaluation; Impasse.
a. The Results of the Evaluation ("Results"):
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(1)

shall be presented in writing to Coet and Labrum jointly no later than

March 15, 2005;
(2) shall present the Evaluation Team's findings and conclusions with respect to
each of the issues described above;
(3) may be accompanied by such explanatory or supporting documentation as the
Evaluation Team may find helpful; and
(4) shall be the joint property of Coet and Labrum.
b. It is anticipated that the Results shall be the unanimous conclusion of the members of
the Evaluation Team, and the Evaluation Team members are directed to use their best efforts to arrive at
a unanimous conclusions on all issues described above. To the extent the members of the Evaluation
Team cannot arrive at a unanimous conclusion with respect to any particular issue, the Evaluation Team
may submit separate reports (or separate sections within the same report) to report their separate findings
and conclusions with respect to any such issue. If at any time during the Evaluation it becomes clear to
the members of the Evaluation Team that they cannot reach a unanimous decision on any issue, the
Evaluation Team or either of its members shall immediately advise Coet and Labrum of the impasse. A
unanimous conclusion by the accountants that they cannot reach a conclusion on any particular accounting
item because one of the parties has not supported its claim after requests by the accountants that it do so
shall result in that particular claim being waived.
8. Release and Waiver. In consideration of the employment by the Evaluation Team of such skill,
due diligence, methods, practices, procedures, and tests as certified public accountants would customarily
use in an engagement of similar scope and complexity, Coet and Labrum, each on behalf of itself, and
all its officers, directors, employees, agents, insurers, affiliates, successors and assigns, waives and
releases the Evaluation Team and each member of the Evaluation Team and their respective employers
from any and all claims, complaints, losses, demands, damages, actions, causes of action, or suits of
whatever kind or nature with respect to or arising out of the dispute between the parties and the issues
described above.
9. Binding Effect; Admissibility of Evaluation Results; Release of Claims. Coet and Labrum agree
that the unanimous findings and conclusions of the Evaluation Team shall be binding on the parties, and
each party accepts and agrees to abide by the unanimous findings and conclusions of the Evaluation Team.
The report(s) and results of the Evaluation Team shall be admissible in any legal proceeding between the
parties to prove or disprove any fact in issue. Each party agrees to pay to the other party any sum(s) the
Evaluation Team unanimously determines is owed by such party to the other party. Upon payment by
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Labrum of any such sum (if any), Coet, for and on behalf of himself, itself and its owners, principals,
affiliates, officers, directors, agents, employees, affiliates, successors and assigns, releases and forever
discharges Labrum and its owners, principals, affiliates, officers, directors, agents, employees, affiliates,
successors and assigns, from any and all claims, demands, suits, causes of action or obligations of
whatever nature, known or unknown, contingent or non-contingent, that anyone claiming through or under
Coet may have or believe to have against Labrum, including without limitation all claims that relate in
any way to the lawsuit with Civil Number 030500537, currently pending in the Fourth Judicial District
Court of Wasatch County, State of Utah (the "Lawsuit"), and any claims asserted or that could have been
asserted in that lawsuit, excepting from this release only such claims as to which there is not a unanimous
decision by the Evaluation Team. Upon payment by Coet of any such sum (if any), Labrum, for and on
behalf of himself, itself and its owners, principals, affiliates, officers, directors, agents, employees,
affiliates, successors and assigns, releases and forever discharges Coet and its owners, principals,
affiliates, officers, directors, agents, employees, affiliates, successors and assigns, from any and all
claims, demands, suits, causes of action or obligations of whatever nature, known or unknown, contingent
or non-contingent, that anyone claiming through or under Labrum may have or believe to have against
Coet, including without limitation all claims that relate in any way to the lawsuit with Civil Number
030500537, currently pending in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Wasatch County, State of Utah, and
any claims asserted or that could have been asserted in that lawsuit, excepting from this release only such
claims as to which there is not a unanimous decision by the Evaluation Team and claims relating to parts
obsolescence. With respect to parts obsolescence, any unanimous finding or conclusion by the Evaluation
Team with respect to the value of parts that are or are not Obsolete Parts shall be binding on both Coet
and Labrum.
10. Preclusive Effect on Additional Claims. The parties acknowledge and agree that the claims
raised in this letter agreement constitute all of the accounting-type claims for damages related to the Asset
Sale Agreement and closing. The parties shall be precluded from raising or asserting (in the Lawsuit or
otherwise) any claims for damages related to the Asset Sale Agreement and the Closing, except for: (i)
any accounting issues that are not resolved by the Evaluation Team and (ii) any legal issues that must be
resolved in order to achieve a complete resolution of the accounting issues specifically addressed in this
Agreement.
If this letter accurately states the terms of our understanding and agreement with respect to the
engagement of accountants to attempt to resolve the disputes and issues described above, please indicate,
on behalf of your clients, your acceptance and approval below on the enclosed duplicate of this letter and
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return a fully-executed copy. Please note that we are prepared to immediately nominate Labrum's
member of the Evaluation Team and to provide the evaluation resources identified in Section 4 above.
Accordingly, we request that your clients give this matter their immediate attention.
Sincerely yours,
SNOW,
& MARTINEAU
NOW, CHRISTENSEN
CHRISTEN
Keith A. Call

ACCEPTED AND AGREED AS WRITTEN

ACCENTED AND AG

Gary R. HO we
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUG
Counsel for Larry J. Coet Chevrolet Pontiac
Buick, Inc.

Steven M. Racker
WISAN SMITH RACKER & PRESCOTT
Certified Public Accountant appointed by
Labrum Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc.

WRITTEN

ACCEPTED AND AGREED AS WRITTEN

j^j?,. t f^HTuL

Becky Tayror
BECKY TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES, CPA
Certified Public Accountant appointed by
Larry J. Coet Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc.
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EXHIBIT 3
Letter of Understanding

Keith A. Call, Attorney
Snow Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gary R. Howe, Attorney
Callister Nebeker & McCullough
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Re: Coet Chevrolet v Labrum Chevrolet et al:
Letter of understanding concerning evaluation of claims
Dear Keith and Gary:
Pursuant to the letter of understanding concerning evaluation of claims dated February 9,
2005, Steven M. Racker, CPA and Becky B. Taylor CPA ("Evaluation Team") have
conducted an evaluation of various claims by Larry J. Coet Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc.
("Coet") and Labrum Chevrolet Pontiac Buick, Inc. ("Labrum"). The results of our
evaluation are as follows:
A. Review and analysis of Used Vehicle Inventory Claims
The Evaluation Team has reviewed and analyzed the Parties' respective
claims with respect to Used Vehicle Inventory.
The Evaluation Team concludes that Labrum owes Coet $46,175.00.
B. Parts
The Evaluation Team was unable to determine the dollar value of parts in
inventory as of November 15,2001 that were Obsolete Parts (as defined
by the sales agreement) nor were they able to determine amounts at
November 15, 2001 that were not Obsolete Parts.
C. Additional Expenses Agreed to at Closing
The Evaluation Team reviewed and analyzed the additional expenses
agreed to at closing as shown on the closing statement dated November
15, 2001 and have concluded all amounts were agreed to by the parties
and amounts were properly allocated on the closing statement and that no
amounts are due either party for such expenses.

D.

Interest from Delayed Pay Off
The Evaluation Team reviewed and analyzed the claims for interest for an
alleged delayed pay off on real estate and new and used car flooring lines.
The Evaluation Team concludes that Labium owes Coet $1,035.98.

E. New Vehicle Inventory
The Evaluation Team reviewed and analyzed the parties* respective claims
with respect to new vehicle inventory.
The Evaluation Team came to a consensus that Labrum owes Coet
$16,911.65. However there is $9,000.00 still in dispute.
Labrum asserts that he made a payment on December 7,2001 to Wells
Fargo on a new vehicle amounting to $9,000.00 and that such amount
should be credited against the new vehicle inventory.
Coet believes that the $9,000.00 payment was against a used vehicle and
therefore should not affect the purchase price.
The Evaluation Team was not able to come to an agreement on whether
the $9,000.00 payment was for a new vehicle or a used vehicle.
F. Other Claims
The Evaluation Team reviewed and analyzed additional claims and
concluded the following:
i.

No amounts are owed either party for this claim.

ii.

Coet owes Labrum $7,211.16 for warranty claims and predelivery
inspections that were credited to Coet's account.

iii.

No amounts are owed either party of this claim.

iv.

Coet owes Labrum $2,897.24 in GM floor plan interest.

v.

Coet owes Labrum $3,702.99 for GM holdbacks.

vi.

No amounts are owed either party for this claim.

vii.

Coet owes Labrum $515.00 for American Express payments.

viii.

No amounts are owed either party for this claim.

ix.

The Evaluation Team could not agree on a wholesale value for the
1992 Ford Three Quarter Ton pick up truck.

x.

The Evaluation Team could not determine the existence of or
dollar value of gas and oil inventory at the date of closing.

xi.

Labrum owes Coet $7,784.96 for parts charged to Coet's GM open
account beginning November 15, 2001 through December 27,
2001.

xii.

Labrum owes Coet $1,803.59 for other charges on Coet's GM
open account from November 28,2001 to January 17,2002

Very Truly Yours,

Mb,

Steven M. Racker
Wisan, Smith, Racker & Prescott, LLP
Certified Public Accountant
Appointed by Labrum Chevrolet Pontiac
Buick, Inc.

Becky B J^aylor
J
Becky Taylor & Associates
Certified Public Accountant
Appointed by Larry J. Coet Chevrolet
Pontiac Buick, Inc.
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EXHIBIT 4
Monthly Summary Report dated November 1, 2001
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J1DCT2001 Month End OCT :'.:001
Sort Sourcei 100
NBR QF PARTS PERCENT
flventcry
Balance
Active Parts
NS Parts
HO Parts
AP Parts
DP Parts
SP Parts
DEL Parts

4,516

35
897
27

7.79
6i?. 24
0.77
15.36
0.59

123

2.72

cb-:

PARI'5 PIECES PERCENT
5,230
1,682

PARIS COST PERCENT
51.410.7C
12,524.40
13,377.15
1,071.32

48

32.16
14.11
2.25
50.55
0.91

0,64

29

0.55

1,167.50

738
118
2,644

•yz> 7 5 3

90

'633.43

24.36
26.02
2.08
46.20
1.32

Parts With No Cost
arts ivith Negative On-Hand
ore/Ex change
isiftos On File

871

arts Added
Active Parts
NS Parts
HO Parts
AP Parts
DP Parts
SP Parts

204

4.51

49

0.93

1,958.33

3.80

204

100,00

49

100.00

1,958.33

100.00

art- »'Memos Deleted

155

13,038.98
3,333.40
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25.36
6.48
6.46
49.20
12.48

iventory Movement - Sales
0 to 3 Months
4 to 6 Months
7 to 12 Months
Over 12 Months
New Parts No Sales

1,144
507
504
1,934
427

25.33
11.22
11.16
42.82
9.45

1,894
526
715
1,330
265

36.21
10.05
13.67
34.99
5.06

iventory Movement - Receipts
0 to 3 Months
4 to 6 Months
7 to 12 Months
Over 12 Months
New Parts No Receipts

571
261
257
2,309
1,078

12.64
5.77
6.57
r
- 51.12 >
23.87

1,25?
371
391
3,043
166

24.07
7.09
7.47
58.18
3.17

143
143

100.00

itstanding Orders
Stockorders
Supplemental Orders
Customer Orders
Backorders
Stockorder Backorders
Supp 1 enrmt 1 Backorders
Customer Backorders
t

jing Forced Orders

28
30

0.62
107.14

(&P*J>h
6,417.78

14,201.05
3,507.90
3,560^20
•''27,906.66 >
2 234"; R* '
1,116.18
1,116.18

27.62
6.32
6.92
54.28
4.34

100.00

